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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will ponder the role of situational pressures, funda-
mental attribution errors, and legal frameworks in how professional
sports actors respond to the threat and occurrence of calamities. Both
natural and manmade threats to American health are likely to rise
over the next decade. Such threats may include catastrophic weather,
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and communicable disease pandem-
ics. In response to these threats, professional sports leagues
("leagues"), professional athletes ("pro athletes" or "players"), fans,
and media might engage in unprecedented behavior.
Consider, for instance, increasingly devastating weather patterns,
and how they might animate leagues to relocate franchises to cities
with more favorable forecasts. The same outcome might arise in the
wake of a natural disaster or a terrorist attack. Similarly worrisome, a
contagious-disease outbreak abroad might lead to scouting and sign-
ing restrictions on foreign players. Closer to home, a disease pan-
demic or a terrorist attack on a pro sporting event might trigger an in-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law
School; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., Georgetown University. I thank
Rick Karcher, Gordon Hylett, James Nafziger, William Li, Jennifer Wieland, and John Gill for
their thoughts and suggestions, and Forrest Hudson, Beverly Walker, and Jess New for their
research assistance. I also thank the Willamette Law Review and Jeffrey Standen for their in-
vitation to participate in the Law Review's symposium on the future of sports law. I was in-
spired to write this article after living through Hurricane Katrina and being spared by it, unlike
so many others living in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. This Article is dedicated to
those persons.
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definite cessation of operations.
Professional athletes appear likewise vulnerable to league-
transformative responses. For instance, persistent weather effects in
the Gulf States might devalue opportunities to play for teams in New
Orleans, Tampa Bay, and Miami. Such an effect may already be evi-
dent: the National Football League ("NFL") and National Football
Players' Association ("NFLPA") are contemplating economic incen-
tives that would facilitate the New Orleans Saints' assuagement of
players reluctant to live in a post-Katrina New Orleans. Incidental
and deleterious effects, such as the development of property stigma
and the exacerbation of racial or cultural tensions, only intensify situ-
ational reluctance. Similar, yet amplified, phenomena might arise
should terrorist attacks diminish the appeal of playing in targeted cit-
ies. The same might be said in the wake of a disease pandemic: play-
ers may refuse to travel or protest to play with persons from certain
geographies and cultures.
Fans and media are, of course, just as likely to alter their behav-
ior in response to the threat and occurrence of calamities. Most obvi-
ously, they may resist attending games should they perceive a suffi-
cient possibility of harm, a phenomenon evidenced during the
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS") in 2003.
On the other hand, they appear strikingly willing to endure catastro-
phic weather and natural disasters in order to attend games. Further-
more, they are generally tolerable of intrusive and delaying antiterror-
ism impositions, such as "pat-downs" and meddling screenings.
Studying the behavior of professional sports actors invites in-
quiry into the potential effects of judgment errors. Social psycholo-
gists and a growing number of legal academics have identified the
prevalence of cognitive biases and heuristics in human thinking.
Cognitive biases and heuristics are "mental shortcuts" that enable in-
dividuals to manage a complex array of stimuli, yet they often distort
decision-making in unappreciated ways. Cognitive biases and heuris-
tics comprise part of a broader defect in human perception known as
the fundamental littribution error, or a tendency to attribute a causal
role to easily-observable yet minimally-influential occurrences, while
simultaneously failing to appreciate highly-influential defects in
thinking. As a result of the fundamental attribution error, situational
happenings-especially those that are dramatically obvious, such as
startling weather events, horrific terrorist attacks, and contagious dis-
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eases---can meaningfully influence attitudes, memories, cognitions,
emotions, and behaviors in unperceived ways.'
These phenomena beg an obvious question for legal scholars:
Can the law be used to mollify the cognitive distortions and situ-
ational influences affecting professional sports actors, and can it di-
rect them towards socially-preferred behavior? For instance, can cit-
ies employ stadium agreements to prevent weather-weary team
owners from hastily relocating their franchises? Can players be con-
tractually-enticed to ignore or discount situational reservations? Can
players of foreign nationality contest heightened, possibly xenophobic
restrictions on their employment? Can fans contest invasive searches
of their body upon entering stadiums? Can media refuse to attend
games without jeopardizing their employment?
Broader implications of the same phenomena are even more en-
gaging. Namely, in light of the diversity of American sports, might
we consider the behavior of professional sports actors in crisis a bell-
wether for American behavior in crisis? That is, might a radical
change in professional sports operations reflect a radical change in
American attitudes and beliefs?
With these questions in mind, this Article will examine external
threats to American sports, related situational influences, and past and
potential behavioral responses. It will also explore legal safeguards to
potentially deleterious behavioral responses, and conclude with gen-
eral thoughts on professional sports as a proxy for American self-
conception.
II. CATASTROPHIC WEATHER, NATURAL DISASTERS, AND
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
In 2005, Americans watched in awe of Mother Nature. Striking
with extraordinary fury, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans
and the southern coasts of Mississippi and Alabama. The Category 5
hurricane killed 1,321 persons, and displaced over 2 million from
their homes.2 To date, Katrina has caused over $150 billion in dam-
ages.3 The striking inability of government actors-at the local, state,
1. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosi-
fon, The Situational Character].
2. See Spencer S. Hsu, Brown Blames Superiors for Response to Katrina, WASH. POST,
Feb. 11, 2006, at A01.
3. Id.
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and federal levels-to prepare for and respond to Katrina has proved
equally shocking. Indeed, acute criticism of governmental efforts to
restore New Orleans persists.4
In light of Katrina, many wonder whether the government will
enhance its capacity to address severe hurricanes and, more broadly,
devastating weather effects. The plausibility of another Katrina-like
storm hitting the United States only amplifies this concern. In fact,
sea surface temperatures have escalated steadily over the last 30
years, a phenomenon that has raised the frequency of catastrophically-
strong hurricanes.5 More technically, the proportion of hurricanes
reaching Categories 4 or 5 has risen from 20 percent in the 1970s to
35 percent in the past decade, a trend expected to climb.6 Although
hurricanes tend to run in 30-year cycles, they are expected to become
gradually more intense, with stronger winds, longer durations, more
rainfall, and less predictable paths.7
Of course, the warming of sea surface temperatures reflects a
broader ecological phenomenon: the Greenhouse effect, or the rise in
Earth temperatures resulting from an increase of atmospheric gases
that repress reflected heat.8 Because of the Greenhouse effect, many
scientists project a higher frequency of "extreme" and hazardous
4. Id.; see also Bob Schieffer, Newt Gingrich Discusses Political Issues, FACE THE
NATION TRANSCRIPT, Jan. 1, 2006, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire (Gingrich calling re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina a "failure of government"); Charles Peters, Titling at Windmills,
WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2005, at 8 ("The Katrina response was not a failure of government;
it was a failure of bad government"); Jonathan Weisman & Michael Abramowitz, Katrina's
Damage Lingers for Bush, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at A01 (asserting that President
Bush's handling of Hurricane Katrina, and particularly the image of him staring outside the
window of Air Force One as it was thousands of feet above New Orleans, may reflect the nadir
of his presidency). For a related legal account, see generally Kevin Kennedy, What the
Weather Can Teach Us About the Unfair Trade Remedy Laws: the Lessons of Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, OCCASIONAL PAPERS INT'L TRADE & POL'Y (2005).
5. See Good Morning America, Heating Up Polar Ice Caps Melting, ABC NEWS
TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 28, 2005, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire.
6. See Fred Pearce, Warning World Blamed for More Strong Hurricanes, NEW
SCIENTIST, Sept. 15, 2005, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire. As a separate measure, Pro-
fessor Kerry Emanuel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology finds that there has been a
50 percent increase in the destructive power of hurricanes over the last century. Id. As a mat-
ter of background, hurricanes can form when ocean temperatures rise above 78.8 degrees
Fahrenheit and the warmer the water, the stronger the storm. Id
7. See Fred Pearce, The Gathering Storm, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec. 3, 2005, at 36.
8. See Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30
Years, NATURE, July 30, 2005 (citing research by Professor Emanuel concerning the link be-
tween rising sea temperatures and global warming); see also Jennifer Woodward, Turning
Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do To Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM.
U.L. REv. 203 (1989) (providing extensive analysis of the Greenhouse Effect).
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weather in the coming years.9 Despite these ominous projections,
lawmakers and citizens appear largely unwilling to engage in correc-
tive environmental reform.'°
Natural disasters, and especially earthquakes, present a related
mode of analysis. Although inherently unpredictable, earthquakes in
"geographic hot spots" are considered especially possible and poten-
tially destructive. Seismologists perhaps most fear a catastrophic
earthquake on the San Andreas Fault in California." Should it occur,
it would endanger the lives of millions of Californians and likely
cause billions of dollars in property damage.' 2 It would also dramati-
cally alter the topography and habitability of our nation's most popu-
lous state.
Effects of catastrophic weather and natural disasters on Ameri-
can professional sports have already manifested. Wildfires, for in-
stance, have forced relocations of professional sporting events. Con-
sider the October 2003 wildfires in San Diego, which propelled that
city's mayor, Dick Murphy, to ask the NFL to relocate a scheduled
game between the Miami Dolphins and the San Diego Chargers.'
3
Although Qualcomm Stadium was not endangered, its parking facility
was used as a location for evacuated residents to obtain food and wa-
ter. 1 4 Mayor Murphy also expressed concern that playing the game
would divert city resources from protecting the lives and property of
San Diego residents.' 5 Unsurprisingly, the NFL, with the consent of
the NFLPA, granted the request and relocated the game to Tempe,
9. See Robin McKie, Irrigation Creates World Water Crisis, OBSERVER, Feb. 25, 2001,
at 23 (citing World Health Organization report).; see also Mike Toner, Major Storms Become
More Frequent: Hurricane Data Suggest Link to Global Warming, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept.
16, 2005, at ID (citing remarks by Peter Webster of Georgia Tech's School of Earth and At-
mospheric Sciences concerning parallel increase in worldwide storms and predictions for
warmer world).
10. See Kristen H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Com-
mons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 186 (2005).
11. See Bill Mongelluzzo, Preparing for the Big One, J. COMMERCE, Oct. 10, 2005, at
18.
12. See Quake Damage Estimates Rise, INSURANCE ACCOUNTANT, July 10, 1995, at 8,
available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire (describing research of Haresh C. Shaw that projects that
an earthquake of an 8.3 magnitude on the Richter Scale would cause up to $225 billion in eco-
nomic damages); see also Rethinking the Catastrophe Risk, ERNEST & YOUNG, May 1, 1996,
at Lexis/Nexis News Wire (describing models that project insured earthquake losses of $70 to
$75 billion).
13. See Craig Dolch, Game Moved to Arizona, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 27, 2003, at 8C.
14. Add footnote
15. Add footnote
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Arizona. 16
Blizzards present a related public safety concern, and thus like-
wise direct professional sports teams to reschedule games. For in-
stance, upon learning of an impending blizzard in January 1996, the
National Basketball Association ("NBA"), in consultation with rele-
vant team officials, postponed a game between the New Jersey Nets
and Atlanta Hawks. 17 The same snow storm led the NBA to postpone
a Seattle Supersonics-New York Knicks contest.' 8 These decisions
appeared reasonable considering that states of emergency had been
declared in both New Jersey and New York. Some speculated that fi-
nancial interests were also salient, since had the games been played,
attendance would have been abnormally low, and thus parking fees,
concession sales, and other in-game revenue would have suffered. 19
Perhaps the most vivid illustration of catastrophic weather and
natural disasters affecting professional sports occurred in 2005, when
following the mass evacuation of New Orleans, the New Orleans
Saints and Hornets relocated their franchises for the 2005 NFL season
and the 2005-06 NBA season, respectively. 20 The Saints played their
home games in San Antonio and Baton Rouge, while the Hornets
played their home games in Oklahoma City.21 The Saints will return
to New Orleans for the 2006 NFL season; the Hornets will play 35 of
their 41 home games in Oklahoma City and the other six in New Or-
leans in the 2007-07 NBA season. 22 Collectively-bargained econom-
ics partly explain the return of the Saints and the eschewal of the
Hornets. Approximately 40 percent of all NFL ticket revenue is
evenly divided among the 30 teams, meaning that an individual NFL
team can withstand diminished attendance (assuming league-wide at-
tendance remains sufficient).23 In contrast, NBA teams do not share
16. Id.
17. See Michael James, Nets Given a Vacation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 1996, at 53.
18. See Sheldon Spencer, Blizzard Postpones Sonics Game, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 8, 1996, at D1. Perhaps Canadians are indeed better at handling the
snow, as instead of postponing games, the Canadian Football League has been known to alter
field dimensions and game rules in order to accommodate snow conditions. See Jonathan
Huntington, Last-Second History: Esks have had a Few Nailbiters in their Season-Ending
Catalogue, EDMONTON SUN, Nov. 5, 2005, at SP4 (describing game in 1991 between the Ed-




22. See Hornets Extend their Stay, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at D6.
23. Add footnote
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gate receipt revenue and are thus far more dependent on locally gen-
erated revenue. 4
The putative return of the Saints highlights the lingering effects
of catastrophic weather and natural disasters. Though the return may
lift the spirits of New Orleans' inhabitants, it appears remarkably
qualified and even tentative. Tellingly, remarks by outgoing NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue suggest a league reluctance to commit
to New Orleans beyond one-year, and even that year appears materi-
ally conditional. "[T]here are a lot of things that have yet to be ac-
complished before we can be certain that it will be a multiyear effort
• . .based on the information we have now, it is too early to tell."' 5
Tagliabue's concerns seem validated by the Saints' ongoing struggles
to sell luxury suites and corporate sponsorships for the 2006 season,
as much of the New Orleans business community appears either un-
able or unwilling to embrace the team's return. 26 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, his doubts reflect broader unease over the social upheaval
and economic devastation suffered by New Orleans, and its uncertain
prospects for recovery.
The geographic instability of the Saints and Hornets' franchises
has triggered myriad emotions among team personnel. Most appar-
ently, a number of Saints' players have expressed frustration over
playing in multiple "home" venues and practice facilities during the
2005 NFL season, as well as dismay at the team's mere tentative re-
turn to New Orleans. 27 Other misgivings include the fear of another
catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans, and lack of suasion over
the franchise's plight.28 To illustrate, defensive end Will Smith re-
24. See Benjamin Hochman, Two Teams, Too Much, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 12, 2006,
at 12.
25. See Tom Osborn, Goodbye-for now, at least, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRESS, Dec. 31,
2005, at IA. Tagliabue's sentiments appeared unchanged in August 2006, when he said that it
was "still an open question" as to whether the Saints would remain in New Orleans. See Mi-
chael McCarthy, Going out on a Swing, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2006, at IC.
26. See Jim Corbett, Saints Tackle New Challenges, USA TODAY, June 29, 2006, at IC.
However, since returning to New Orleans, the Saints have established a franchise record for
season tickets sold. Although these sales may reflect an ephemeral "rally-around-the-city"
effect, they nevertheless suggest that Saints' fans in New Orleans still care deeply about their
team. Id.
27. Saints quarterback Aaron Brooks even threatened to quit the team during the season
due to the team's nomadic and uncertain plight. See Joe Menzer, Saints' Season is Upheaval,
Uncertainty, WINSTON-SALEM J., Dec. 17, 2005, at C8.
28. See e.g., Tarnmy Nunez, Saints May Have Made their Last Stand in Louisiana,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 19, 2005, at 5 (citing remarks by Aaron Stecker). Ironically, or per-
haps fittingly (depending on your viewpoint), the Saints drafted Bush with the second overall
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cently bemoaned that "everybody feels like we were treated like chil-
dren [by the NFL]. 29
Similarly meaningful, prospective selections in the 2006 NFL
draft, such as Reggie Bush of the University of Southern California,
openly rued the thought of being drafted by the Saints.30  Financial
advisors to those players were more critical. According to one, "from
a marketing standpoint, it would be terrible. There's not even a city
to market the player to."'31 To illustrate this "marketing concern,"
consider that with the New Orleans business community decimated,
fewer sponsors may be interested in tie-ins with the team or its play-
ers.
32
On the other hand, the NFL, the NBA, and their respective play-
ers' associations evince a willingness to counteract some of these lo-
cale-related concerns. Most demonstrably, the NFL and NFLPA paid
each Saints player a $40,000 bonus in December 2005 for "perform-
ing under unusual and unanticipated conditions arising from the Hur-
ricane Katrina tragedy., 33 They also contemplated the offering of fi-
nancial assistance to players who sign with the Saints during the 2006
off season, a period when teams may sign free agent players. 34 Sig-
nificantly, NFL observers posit "post-Katrina hesitance among free
agents to remain with or join [the Saints]" as likely animating.35
Moreover, several Saints players have stated, off-the-record, that they
would not remain with the team if given a choice. 36 Enhanced finan-
pick in the 2006 NFL draft.
29. See Mike Finger, Players Split About Saints' Adieu, SAN ANTONIO-EXPRESS, Dec.
31, 2005, at IC.
30. For instance, University of Southern California star Reggie Bush recently said of
possibly being drafted by the Saints, "It's a tough situation. When that time comes I'll deal
with it." See Billy Witz, Road to Nowhere?, DAILY NEWS OF Los ANGELES, Dec. 30, 2005, at
S1; see also Brent Schrotenboer, Marketers see Green over Bush Potential, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 3, 2006, at D1 (describing New Orleans as "[not] exactly a launching pad
right now for individual marketing potential"). Ironically, Bush was drafted by the New Or-
leans Saints. See 2006 NFL Draft, NFL.COM, available at http://www.nfl.com/
draft/drafttracker/round/roundl (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
31. See Witz, supra note 24.
32. Id. (citing remarks by Paul Swangard, director of the Warsaw Sports Marketing Cen-
ter at the University of Oregon).
33. See NFL Giving Saints Performance Bonuses, NFL.COM, Dec. 14, 2005, at
http://www.nfl.com/teams/story/NO/9096888.
34. See Jeff Duncan, NFL Looking at Options to Help New Orleans Attract Free Agents,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 1..
35. See Dan Uthman, Wanted. Winning Coach, OREGONIAN, Jan. 3, 2006, at DO1.
36. See Witz, supra note 24.
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cial benefits to those who sign or re-sign with the Saints might work
to assuage such trepidations.37
It remains uncertain whether these prospective benefits material-
ize or prove sufficient. 38 In January 2006, it was thought that the
Saints' ability to re-sign its only Pro Bowler, center LeCharles Bent-
ley, would prove foretelling. 39 Bentley's agent, Peter Schaeffer, shed
intriguing light on his client's decision-making process: "Right now,
there's just not enough information. From a player's perspective...
you want a stable situation, great homes, a family atmosphere -
they're going to want to have that in place.",40 Unfortunately for the
Saints, Bentley signed with the Cleveland Browns on March 11,
2006, only hours after the start of free agency.41 At that time, media
wondered whether "the Saints may have a tough sell bringing stars to
hurricane-ravaged New Orleans., 42 Days later, however, the Saints
signed heralded free agent quarterback Drew Brees, who spoke fa-
vorably of the opportunity to live in a recovering New Orleans.43
Then again, in signing Brees to a six-year, $60 million contract, the
Saints offered him considerably more than any other team.44 Sugges-
tively, therefore, enhanced compensation as a "trade-off' for players
seeking a stable, comfortable place of employment may impose sig-
nificant financial burdens on locale-disadvantaged teams. Such a
finding would appear consistent with my scholarship on the influence
of non-monetary motivations on player decision-making.45
37. See Duncan, supra note 28.
38. As of April 30, 2006, the NFL and NFLPA had not instituted any special incentives
for free agents to sign with the Saints, but were said to have "discussed ways to aid the team in
free agency." See Mike Triplett, Room to Grow, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 2, 2006, at 1 (citing
remarks by Saints General Manager Mickey Loomis). There are no indications that the any
financial assistance is forthcoming.
39. See Witz, supra note 24.
40. Id.
41. See James Walker, Bentley Tops Browns Signings, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 12,
2006, at 16E.
42. See e.g., Harvey Fialkov & Alex Marvez, Brees a Wanted Man, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2006, available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports
/football/pro/dolphins/sfl-dol l2marl 2,0,2014691.story?coll=orl-dolphins.
43. See Jim Mashek, Newest Saint Drew Brees ready to put the doubts behind him, SUN
HERALD, Mar. 15, 2006, at Sports.
44. Many teams were concerned by Brees' recent shoulder surgery, yet the Saints ap-
peared content with his shoulder's status. See Mike Triplett, Fresh Brees, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Mar. 15, 2006, at 1.
45. See generally Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money: The Role of Prefer-
ences, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1501 (forthcoming, 2006) (draft available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=822864) [herein-
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The uncertain willingness of players to sign with the New Or-
leans Saints-perhaps even at financial premiums-may illuminate a
broader concern for pro sports leagues: Will catastrophic weather and
natural disasters trigger lasting player movements away from certain
franchises, thus rendering those franchises incapable of fielding com-
petitive teams? Significantly, the "stigma" now associated with New
Orleans appears considerable and perhaps enduring. Through televi-
sion, the nation observed unthinkable scenes: persons drowning in
their attics, bodies floating in flooded streets, mass hysteria, lawless-
ness, and surrounding communities refusing New Orleans residents
safe passage out-of-the city. The list of frightening, even inhuman im-
ages could extend for pages. Along those lines, will Saints players
and team employees want to return to the Superdome, the very same
facility which precariously "housed" 23,000 evacuees?
46
The enduringness of these images comports to socio-
psychological expectations of stigma, or the "social marker" labeling
a particular person, entity, or concept as deficient or deviant.47 Such a
marker may dramatically alter perception of emotion, thought, and
behavior, with the stigmatized object suffering behavioral conse-
quences, such as inferior treatment, repudiation, or censure. 48 Reputa-
tional damage can arise immediately upon the marker's attachment, a
phenomenon only exaggerated by the human tendency to "assume
that people deserve what happens to them.",49 Perhaps most troubling,
these phenomena often endure due to the "self-fulfilling prophecy ef-
fect," whereby external actors elicit behavior from the stigmatized ob-
ject that tends to confirm the stigma.5 °
Significantly, stigma has been evidenced in the context of prop-
erty and locale, as once marked by any perceived "contamination,"
after McCann, It's Not About the Money].
46. See Mike Hasten, Board looking closer at Superdome contract, TIMES, Oct. 22,
2005, at IA (describing conditions in Superdome).
47. See Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fear Itself: A Social- Psychological Model of
Stigma Harm and Its Legal Implications, 76 NEB. L. REv. 452, 476 (1997).
48. Id. citing EDWARD E. JONES ET AL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
MARKED RELATIONSHIPS 4-7 (1984).
49. Id. citing MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOxiC EXPOSURE 14 (1988); see also Lu-in
Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate ": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-
Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 91-92 (1997) (describing how people tend to regard
outcomes are attributable to choice rather than chance).
50. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling, 1 PSYCH. PUB.
POL. & L. 6, 10(1995).
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such property or locale will suffer diminution to its status.5 1 More-
over, due to "courtesy stigma," entities associable with the property or
locale (such as residents or businesses) may encounter stigma by their
mere association.5 2 For that reason, sheer circumstance and unin-
tended coincidence may compel associable entities to share in the
stigmatizing discredit. Because of their association with New Or-
leans, the Saints and Hornets may therefore resemble less appealing
employment venues, and that disesteem may persist because of
stigma's enduringness.
Racial dynamics also appear relevant when assessing the capac-
ity of New Orleans teams to attract players. Indeed, the lasting im-
ages of Katrina-the stranded, hungry, dehydrated, and predomi-
nantly African-American New Orleans residents clinging to life while
the government appeared peculiarly focused on preventing "looting"
and other property damage-might impair the Saints and Hornets' re-
cruitment of African-American players, who comprise nearly 80 per-
cent of all NFL and NBA players.53 Other images may have exposed
underlying racial tensions, such as the neighboring and predominantly
white community of Gretna closing a bridge that would have supplied
safe passage for thousands of African-American stuck in New Or-
leans, 54 or the decision of the nearly all-white parish of St. Bernard,
which boarders the nearly all-African-American Lower 9 th War, to
line rail cars across the roads as a blockade.55 Significantly, social
psychologists find that images, both actual and imagined, can prove
strikingly influential in decision-making processes.56 For that reason,
images associable with racism might affect player interest in the
Saints and Hornets.
Such a deduction has been suggested in other settings. Perhaps
most famously, African-American athletes have sometimes expressed
unwillingness to play for Boston sports teams due to the memory of
specific racial incidents, such as the Red Sox refusing to work out
51. See Geisinger, supra note 41, at 476.
52. See Edelstein, supra note 43, at 180.
53. See Dave Krieger, Fact or F(R)lction?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005, at
2C (noting that nearly 80 percent of NBA players are African-American); see also Michael I.
Ninman, Katrina's America: Failure, Racism, and Profiteering, HUMANIST, Nov. 1, 2005, at
11 (commentating on the effects of Katrina on race relations in New Orleans).
54. See Tim Jones, Town Defends Closing Bridge to Safety, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 2005, at
11.
55. See Howard Witt, Suspicions Fire Racial Tensions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2005, at 1.
56. See generally McCann, It's Not About the Money, supra note 39.
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Willie Mays in 1949 or, in 1990, white police officers surrounding the
Celtics' Dee Brown with their guns drawn and then forcing him to the
ground because they had confused him with a robbery suspect.57 In-
deed, Barry Bonds has said that he would never play in Boston be-
cause of past racial incidents,58 while others, such as Marquis
Grissom and David Justice, are thought to have negotiated no-trade
clauses to the Red Sox for similar concerns. 59  Equal meaningful,
these perceptions have lingered in spite of concerted efforts by Bos-
ton's sports franchises to combat perceived racial insensitivity.
60
Suggestively, therefore, attempts by the Saints and Hornets to dis-
tance themselves from racially-motivated incidents during Katrina
may prove inefficacious.
Optimism bias also appears relevant when assessing the role of
catastrophic weather and natural disasters in professional sports, and
particularly when considering the future of the Saints and Hornets in
New Orleans. Optimism bias posits that individuals assume that gen-
eral risks do not apply with equal force to themselves 61 or, more sim-
ply, that "good things are more likely than average to happen to us
and bad things are less likely than average to happen to us." 62 For in-
stance, because of optimism bias, the average American estimates a
one in five chance of personally being the victim of a violent crime,
yet believes that the average American has about a two in five chance
57. See Mike Freeman, Bonds Right About Racism in Beantown, FLORIDA-TIMES
UNION, June 25, 2004, at C1 (describing arrest of Dee Brown); see also Michael Arace & Jim
Shea, Celtics Say Perception of Prejudice Off Base, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 19, 2002, at
Fl (discussing ESPN poll where readers considered the Celtics to be the franchise most likely
to chose their players on the basis of race rather than ability); Sharon O'Brien, "We Want a
Pennant, Not a White Team ": How Boston 's Ethnic and Racial History Shaped the Red Sox, in
JOHN BLOOM & MICHAEL NEVIN WILLARD, SPORTS MATTERS: RACE, RECREATION, AND
CULTURE 168-83 (2002) (examining role of Boston Irish Catholics in unwillingness of the
Boston Red Sox to sign African-American players).
58. Id.
59. See Gordon Edes, Duquette Takes another Hit, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1997, at
G3.
60. See e.g., Larry Whiteside, Neither the Celtics nor Red Sox fit into Racist Mold,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 1992 (describing efforts by Boston Red Sox and Boston Celtics to
improve African-American opinion of their franchises).
61. See Jon Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1511-12 (1999); see also Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 216
(1995) (finding that "as a systematic matter, people are unrealistically optimistic").
62. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091 (2000).
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63of being one.
In the context of New Orleans, optimism bias may have been
present when the government promised a complete and prompt recov-
ery-"to do what it takes," in the words of President George W.
Bush64 -followed by a profoundly gauche and disjointed recovery ef-
fort.65  As of this writing, many displaced persons lack temporary
housing and many business owners await government loans that were
promised months earlier.66 At the same time, the streets are still lit-
tered with tons of debris,67 and only a third of the city's structures
have electricity and even fewer enjoy hot water and coking gas.68
Equally troubling, New Orleans features only one full-service emer-
gency room, which is so congested that patients can wait as long as
six hours before receiving "emergency" care. 69 Similarly worrisome,
there persist myriad reports of lawlessness. 70 Speculatively then, per-
haps the Saints' return to the New Orleans for the 2006 NFL season
reflects a bit of underappreciated risk, hubris, and exaggerated hope.
The above analysis is not intended to suggest that New Orleans
cannot recover from Hurricane Katrina and return to its status as one
of the nation's most popular cities. However, the apparent impulse to
"rush" sports franchises back to the city may only diminish the prob-
ability of those franchises remaining there. As described above, the
potential for stigma to remain attached to both property and people
63. See Neal R. Feigenson, Responsibility and Blame: Psychological and Legal Perspec-
tives: Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 911 Cases, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 959, n.
82 (2003).
64. See Silla Brush & Bret Schulte, Fiscal Disaster Down on the Bayou, U.S. News &
World Report, Nov..21, 2005, at 27.
65. See Mark Silva, Bush: Katrina Recovery Hits "Some Rough Spots, " CHI. TRIB., Jan.
13, 2006, at 11.
66. Id. In fact, almost one-quarter of all jobs in New Orleans have been lost, and the city
anticipates a housing deficiency of 84,000 housing units in 2006 and 102,000 housing units in
2008. See James A. Richardson, What's Needed for Post-Katrina Recovery, LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY, Mar. 10, 2006, available at http://www.fsround.org/pdfs
/RichardsonStudy-F1NAL.pdf. Many of these jobs, and particularly those in the professional
and business services sector and wholesale and retail trade sector, are unlikely to return.
67. Id.
68. See Rukmini Callimachi, 6 Months Later, New Orleans Farfrom Whole, AP, Feb.
25, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/02/25/
6_monthslater new orleans far from whole/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
69. See New Orleans Ambulances Play Waiting Game, WESH.COM, Feb. 10, 2006,
available at http://www.wesh.com/health/6907472/detail.html.
70. See Michael Perlstein, Police Reports Conceal Looting, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 7,
2006, available at http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-
5/1139296077325360.xml.
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suggests an obvious need to diminish images that exacerbate stigma.
Moreover, the recovery of New Orleans remains a work-in-progress,
with adequate hospital care and other essential components of a mod-
em American city still unachieved. For these reasons, New Orleans
should probably first establish a visually stable and credible locale be-
fore its sports franchises claim a permanent return. Devoted local
ownership would only further abate stigma, as it would dissuade un-
ease that a short-term delay in returning would forecast an ultimate
departure from New Orleans. Nevertheless, the NFL has elected to
return the Saints to New Orleans in 2006, even with an ownership
group that some believe would prefer to relocate the franchise.
7 1
Though instructive, the New Orleans example only touches on
broader concerns of catastrophic weather and natural disasters on pro-
fessional sports. Consider, for instance, how professional sports
leagues might respond to greater frequencies of catastrophic weather
and natural disasters in particular geographic settings, such as if
coastal communities were projected to endure more frequent and
damaging hurricanes. Certainly, leagues may be weary of awarding
new franchises to geographically vulnerable areas, as available public
financing for sports and other non-essential expenditures would likely
plummet. Indeed, professional sports teams tend to rely heavily on
local tax revenue to finance new facility costs, with taxpayers typi-
cally financing two-thirds of the cost of new professional sports facili-
ties.
72
More controversially, leagues may consider relocating franchises
to "less vulnerable" areas of the country, particularly if population
groups and business actors were to gradually migrate away from vul-
nerable communities. Such shifts are plausible, as socio-economists
find that "people are willing to pay indirectly for local amenities, such
as good weather ... in the form of higher rents and lower wages. 73
History also proves indicative: when contemplating relocation, fran-
71. See e.g., Joanne Korth, Wanted: Place to Call Home, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
2, 2005, at IC (discussing reports that Saints' majority owner Tom Benson would prefer to
move the franchise to San Antonio); Joseph Nocera, Take the Money and Stay, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2006, at 68 (describing Benson's strong business and personal ties to San Antonio, as
well as the population and economic growth of San Antonio, as evidence of his desire to move
the Saints to there); Scott Ferrell, Arnold Fielkow's Firing Not a Good Sign for New Orleans
Saints Fans, TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at IC (noting how Benson fired a team executive for pub-
licly stating a preference that the Saints remain in Louisiana).
72. See Gerald A. Carlino & Edward N. Coulson, BUSINESS REV., June 22, 2004, at 7
(citing analysis by economist Raymond Keating).
73. Id.
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chises routinely consider such criteria as population trends, demo-
graphics, average income, and the number of local corporations able
to purchase luxury seating. 74 Likewise, social psychologists identify
the salience of "groupism" in human movement, as humans and eco-
nomic entities more often move with others than by themselves,
meaning population shifts might stimulate large population segments
and business actors to follow.75 Taken together, economic and psy-
chological deductions suggest that as locales diminish in appeal, peo-
ple and businesses will move from them, and economic incentives
and situational pressures will similarly lead sports teams out-of-
town.
76
On the other hand, one might ask, if population groups indeed
move in fear of natural calamities, then why has California's popula-
tion only surged in spite of persistent threats of catastrophic earth-
quakes? In fact, California is now home to over 35 million persons, a
startling 15 million increase over the last 15 years.77 Moreover, de-
mographers believe that California's population will rise to over 45
million persons by 2030.78 The state of Florida presents a more com-
pelling case-study: despite ominous warnings in 1990 of increased
hurricane activity,79 and despite a fruition of such warnings over the
next decade, 80 Florida's population increased by 20 percent from
74. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 945 (1999); see also Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues,
73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 664 (1989) (explaining relevance of demographic analysis in assess-
ment of locale viability for Major League Baseball teams).
75. See generally Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board.- The Perils of Groupthink, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003) (discussing influence of group dynamics on human behavior).
76. Then again, some posit that franchise relocations in and of themselves diminish
overall fan interest in particular leagues, as such relocations reveal to fans the potential
ephemeral nature of local fandom. See generally JEFFREY DALTON JAMES, BECOMING A
SPORTS FAN: UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FAN LOYALTY (1997).
77. See 2000 Cal Facts California's Demographics, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST'S OFFICE, Dec. 2000, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2000
/calfacts/2000_calfacts demographics.html
78. See California Population, NEGATIVE POPULATION GROWTH,
http://www.npg.org/states/ca.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
79. See William M. Gray, Strong Association between West African rainfall and US.
landfall of intense hurricanes, SCIENCE, Sept. 14, 1990, at 1251.
80. See Joni Jones, Citizens Failed to Enforce Penalties, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
23, 2005, at 1A (noting increased hurricane activity in Florida over recent years); see also Tes-
timony by Pamela Duncan, Legislative Affairs Director with the Florida Department of Com-
munity Affairs, before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services Subcommit-
tee on Housing and Community, July 12, 1999, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire
(discussing extensive hurricane damage in Florida from 1992 to 1999).
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1990 to 2000, almost double the percentage increase of the U.S. popu-
lation.81 Although both California and Florida may represent
uniquely desirable locales, and although possibly affected by opti-
mism bias, their recent demographic experiences suggest that "fear of
disaster" may not propel population movements. Only strengthening
this point in the context of professional sports is the commonly ex-
pressed desire of pro athletes to play for teams in California and Flor-
ida.8
2
Consider also the striking resilience of fans to support their
teams in spite of natural obstacles. Routine examples may be found
on any given Sunday, in any given December, in places like Foxboro,
Massachusetts, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Kansas City, Green Bay, and
Buffalo, where fans appear more than willing to brave dangerous
blizzard conditions in order to watch their NFL teams play, even
when they probably would not undertake the same health hazard for
other life activities.
83
More dramatic and singular instances also prove instructive.
Take, for instance, the 1989 World Series between the Oakland Ath-
letics and the San Francisco Giants. It was interrupted by an earth-
quake that killed over 60 persons in San Francisco, 84 and despite fears
of additional quakes, fans responded by filling the stadium for the re-
maining games. 85  Social commentators criticized Major League
Baseball for a lack of sensitivity in continuing with the Series,86 yet
the outpouring of fans, coupled with the absence of additional quakes,
appeared to validate the league's decision. Granted, as some critics
81. See Florida Demographic Summary 2000, FLORIDA BUSINESS DATA,
http://www.florida-business-data.com/demographics-state-summary.htm (last visited Aug. 26,
2006).
82. See e.g., John Lowe, Sense of Loss Creeps into Tigers' Winter, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 17, 2004, at 1E (describing how outfielder Steve Finley told the Detroit Tigers
that he preferred to play in California, despite the Tigers' lucrative offer); see also McCann,
It's Not About the Money, supra note 39, at 1537 (describing effects of weather preferences
among professional athletes).
83. See e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald, Patriots Fans have Zeal to Keep Selves Warm,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2004, at AI (describing how Patriots fans do not mind the snowy con-
ditions for games).
84. See 2 More Bodies Found in Ruined Highway's Rubble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1989,
at B6.
85. See Joe Gergen, Many Happy Returns, NEWSDAY, Oct. 28, 1989, at 35.
86. See e.g., Moss Klien, NFL Lesson in '63 Should have Guided Vincent, THE
SPORTING NEWS, Oct. 30, 1989, at 47 (concluding, "despite their good intentions, Commis-
sioner Fay Vincent and league officials should have canceled the Series, conceding that the
tragedy caused by the earthquake made the continuation offensive").
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asserted, the games may have served more as a situational distraction
than an expression of fortitude.87 That particular criticism reflects a
broader social critique that when sports fans flock to games in times
of crisis, and when society applauds their behavior, a human vulner-
ability to escapism emerges: "In the immediate aftermath of disaster,
we are always told that the games must go on. Not simply because
that's the normal order of business. But because the games provide a
welcome diversion that suffering people desire . . . graveside looks
soon turn into painted faces and mournful laments are replaced by
howls of delight., 88 Moreover, when juxtaposed with the plight of
New Orleans, the human suffering and cost triggered by the San
Francisco earthquake doubtless paled in comparison to that triggered
by Katrina. Nevertheless, sports leagues might infer confidence from
the response of the Bay community when contemplating the future of
franchises in New Orleans and, more broadly, the sustainability of
professional sports franchises in areas affected by catastrophic
weather and natural disasters.
Perhaps the strongest "anchor" of a professional sports team to a
particular location in crisis rests in the legal nexus between franchises
and host governments. Although government and league machina-
tions to prevent franchise owners from relocating their franchises
have typically been found to violate Section I of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act,89 the Lanham Trademark Act9 ° furnishes governments with
considerable authority to reserve some ownership of team names and
associated images. 91 Through certain stadium lease agreements, cities
87. See Bill Lyon, It's an Insult to Continue this World Series, KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWS
SERV., Oct. 20, 1989, available at Westlaw News Wire.
88. See Bob Molinaro, Once Again, We're Forced to Put Sports in Perspective,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Sept. 6, 2005, at Cl. For a more positive perspective on the same phe-
nomenon, see Jenni Carlson, Tournament Provides us a Diversion, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar.
19, 2003, at IC (describing the NCAA March Madness tournament as, "It is our oasis. The
games must go on. We need the wackiness, the craziness, the insanity to balance the reality of
these days. President Bush on the television. Troops at the front. Guns at the ready. Games
won't make us forget these things but may help us cope with them").
89. 15 U.S.C. 1 (2001); For examples of teams relocating without league or city permis-
sion, see L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F. 2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (Los Angeles Raiders moving to Oakland); NBA v. SDC Bas-
ketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (San Diego Clippers moving to Los Angeles).; see
also Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in
Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1984) (supplying overview of antitrust law
and franchise relocation).
90. Lanham Trademark Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1942) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. 1051-1127 (2003)).
91. See Don Nottingham, Keeping the Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law as
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and other governmental actors may also inhibit or substantially delay
any breach of contract.92 Moreover, even when those governmental
actors lack sound legal bases to foil franchise relocation, the mere
threat of costly and controversial litigation can prove sufficiently de-
terring. 93 Although the Saints are not legally anchored in New Or-
leans, the Hornets may be.94 More broadly then, legal anchors illumi-
nate a potentially useful tool for communities to preserve their teams
in spite of catastrophic weather and natural disasters.
Taken together, an analysis of professional sports in settings of
catastrophic weather and natural disasters suggests an intriguing
framework: theoretical applications of economics and social psychol-
ogy intimate that franchises may suffer by remaining in geographi-
cally vulnerable settings, as populations and business actors would
likely relocate, yet practical experience indicates that population
groups, including teams, do not move in "fear." Practical experience
also suggests that fans are especially resilient when attending games,
as they are uniquely willing to tolerate risk "for the love of the game."
In some settings, leagues also possess legal incentives to refrain from
franchise relocation efforts.
On the other hand, when contemplating the specific plight of the
Saints and Hornets in New Orleans, added dynamics of stigma, race,
enigmatical ownership, and optimism bias collectively discourage
their immediate return. Indeed, the unique qualities of a nightmarish
Katrina and a recuperating New Orleans pose uncharted waters for
Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L. REv.
1065, 1074 (2004).
92. See generally Matthew J. Minton & Bruce W. Barton, Professional Sports Franchise
Relocations from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competi-
tion, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 69-70
(1997); but see Lisa-Michele Smith, History, Rivalry, Envy, and Relocation: Will the Sale of
the New York Jets Give Rise to a New Stadium?, 7 SPORTS L. J. 309, n. 175 (noting that even if
a city were to negotiate a long-term lease with a franchise, the team owner can usually break
the lease and pay damages for breach of contract, as injunctions are unlikely).
93. See Statement of Paul Tagliabue, Commissioner of the National Football League,
before the House Committee on Commerce, May 16, 1996, available at Lexis/Nexis News
Wire; see also Nottingham, supra note 85, at 1079 (describing effect of threat of litigation on
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue in league decision to allow Rams to move from Los Ange-
les to St. Louis in 1995; Marc Topkin, Seattle Side Fires Back at Baseball, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 28, 1992, at IC (noting how Major League Baseball were concerned with threat
of litigation by the city of Seattle should it have attempted to relocate Seattle Mariners to St.
Petersburg).
94. The Saints' principal owner, Tom Benson, negotiated the right to opt out of his con-
tract (which runs through 2010) to play in the publicly-financed Superdome, provided he make
an $81 million payment to the state of Louisiana. See Ferrell, supra note 65.
[42:585
2006] SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, CALAMITIES, AND SPORTS LAW 603
leagues, teams, and players. Nevertheless, for reasons described
above, a hasty return may only precipitate a permanent relocation.
III. TERRORISM AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Since the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on
September 11, 2001, terrorism and the law has become a popular and
essential topic in legal scholarship.95 Legal scholars have debated the
appropriate balance between security and liberty, and this topic will
remain at the forefront of scholarship for years to come. Naturally, it
has also attracted the interest of elected officials and policy-makers
who seek to prevent future attacks while simultaneously preserving
core democratic values.
Professional sports actors have also been deeply affected by ter-
rorism and the fear of future attacks. The concern is multi-fold. Per-
haps most obviously, a terrorist attack at a major sporting event could
cause tens of thousands of casualties. Just consider how a terrorist at-
tack during Super Bowl XL could have endangered the lives of over
9665,000 persons, or how one during Super Bowl XIV could have
done the same to over 103,000 persons.97 Aside from immediate
deaths, local hospitals would likely struggle to treat tens of thousands
of suddenly wounded persons, and even those unharmed by the attack
could be kill or injured while frantically fleeing the stadium.98
Likewise troubling, major sporting events are considered "soft
targets" or those particularly vulnerable and difficult-to-secure. In-
deed, sporting events tend to feature large numbers of persons con-
stantly entering and exiting a confined facility, as well as significant
95. On April 30, 2006, a search of "terrorism" and "law" among titles of law review
publications on Lexis/Nexis published from September 11, 2001 to April 30, 2006 yielded 197
results.
96. See Super Bowl Information, SUPER BOWL.COM (Official Website of Super Bowl
XL), at http://www.superbowl.com/features/generalinfo (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
97. See Highest Attendance at a Super Bowl, GUINNESS BOOK OF WORLD RECORDS,
available at http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/contentjpages/record.asp?recordid=45816
(last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
98. See Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circum-
scribed Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 777 (2003) (describing
effect of terrorist attack on heavily populated areas, such as sporting events, parades, or major
tourist attractions); see also B. Tilman Jolly & Ricardo Martinez, Heart-stopping Action:
Whether it's A Sporting Event or A Rock Concert, Medical Emergencies can Spoil the Fun and
Create Liability Unless Management Plans Ahead, 4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT 94 (2004) (de-
scribing how a state of panic would exacerbate harm following a terrorist attack on a major
sporting event).
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and often congested movement of persons within that facility.99 Less
obviously, patrons of sporting events tend to be highly-focused on the
game rather than on their surroundings, and are thus less likely to de-
tect wrongdoing and nefariousness than in other settings.'0 0 Stadium
security personnel are also disadvantaged by the situational pressure
of impatient fans seeking to enter the stadium, as well as by the prac-
tical necessity of preventing long and slow-moving entrance lines.' l
According to some experts, stadium security personnel seldom pos-
sess sufficient anti-terrorist training,10 2 and are thus especially vulner-
able to the "situation" of large numbers of fans anxiously waiting to
enter the stadium. In other words, sporting events typically entail tens
of thousands of distracted persons moving in and around difficult to
secure areas that are protected by questionably-trained personnel.
Consider also the symbolic value of sporting events: they repre-
sent a core component of "Americana" and embody shared emotional
capital. However quixotically, Americans tend to view sports as em-
blematic of a culture of perceived merit and hard work, and how dis-
positional qualities are thought to determine level of achievement.' 0 3
An attack on a major sporting event may thus inflict a deep wound
upon our national psyche, as well as unhinge the psychological un-
derpinnings that are thought to separate "us" from the rest of the
world.
Financial considerations are also salient. An attack on a major
sporting event could impose massive tort liability on the sponsoring
league, the hosting team, and stadium operators for inadequate secu-
99. See Caitlin M. Piccarello, Terrorism, Tourism, and Torts: Liability in the Event of a
Terrorist Attack on a Sports or Entertainment Venue, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 366-
67 (2005).
100. See generally DANIEL L. WANN, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF
SPECTATORS (2000).
101. See Angelo Bruscas, Extra Security Hounding Sports Fans Everywhere, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 26, 2003, at El (discussing situational pressures on stadium secu-
rity personnel).
102. See generally Benjamin D. Goss et al., Primary Principles ofPost-9/11 Stadium
Security in the United States: Transatlantic Implications from British Practices, available at
http://www.iaam.org/CVMS/Post/20911%20Stadium%20Security.doc (last visited Aug. 26,
2006).
103. This topic is one of great debate, and I am currently co-authoring a piece on it. For
an interesting discussion of sports and social movements, see generally Donald T. Meir, Pri-
mary Assumption of Risk and Duty in Football Indirect Injury Cases: A Legal Workout From
the Tragedies on the Training Ground for American Values, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 80, 145
(2002).
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rity.10 4 Perhaps not surprisingly, the cost of property and liability in-
surance for professional sports teams and related actors has skyrock-
eted in recent years.
10 5
Lastly, consider the actuality of a terrorist strike on a game. In
October 2005, a 21-year-old engineering student detonated a bomb
100 yards from the University of Oklahoma Memorial football sta-
dium which was filled with 84,000 fans.10 6  The bomber died in-
stantly, and none of the fans were hurt. However, a bus driver was in-
jured by the blast, which "was so powerful that people up to four
miles away reported hearing it and windows in [a building] 100 yards
away shattered." 10 7 Of perhaps equal worry, un-detonated explosive
devices were found nearby. 08 University of Oklahoma and govern-
ment officials downplayed the incident as an isolated event and the
product of an emotionally disturbed student, 10 9 yet others have char-
acterized it as possible domestic terrorism and indicative of the vul-
nerability of sporting events.' 10
In light of this multi-tiered concern, it is unsurprising that
leagues are now intently focused on event security. Consider the
104. See Piccarello, supra note 93, at III; see generally Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging:
Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price
Regulation, 94 KENTUCKY L. J. (forthcoming, 2006) (exploring economic implications of ter-
rorism on assorted economic actors).
105. See e.g., Barnet D. Wolf, Paying a Price for Security, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May
25, 2002, at IC (noting that at Miller Park, home of Major League Baseball's Brewers, the cost
of property and liability insurance, which covers terrorism, skyrocketed from $255,000 in
2001 to $2.3 million in 2002).
106. See Cinnamon Stillwell, Terrorism Strikes the Homeland, ACCURACY IN MEDIA,
Oct. 7, 2005, at http://www.aim.org/guestcolumI/4077 0 6 0 C/; see also Joel Mowbray,
Florida Judge Shockingly Halts Security Searches at Games, TowN HALL, Oct. 31, 2005, at
http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/joelmowbray/2005/l0/31/173449.html (noting dis-
tance between bomb and stadium).
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing remarks by Douglas Hagmann, Director of the Northeast Intelligence
Network).
109. Id.; see also Motives Sought for Oklahoma Suicide Bombing, Fox NEWS
TRANSCRIPTS (HANNITY AND COLMES), Oct. 14, 2005, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire
(quoting U.S. Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK): "[E]verything so far appears to indicate this was indeed
an isolated incident, a very lonely and troubled young man who had had a rather disturbed
adolescence and early adulthood. And frankly resulted in suicide. We don't find any evidence
at all of a terrorist activity or any plots, not in the Islamic community.").
110. See e.g., Motives Sought for Oklahoma Suicide Bombing, supra note 103 (quoting
Fox News commentator Sean Hannity: He had a Pakistani roommate... Well, Congressman,
he blew himself -- he blew himself up 100 yards away from a football stadium packed with
85,000 people. It is beyond rare, the person that commits suicide with a bomb ... Should it
not raise suspicion and concern?")
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NFL. According to Milton Ahlerich, the NFL's Vice President of Se-
curity, "event security immediately became, through pronouncement
by our commissioner, the number one priority of the National Foot-
ball League" after 9/11.111 In fact, NFL officials conclude that the
league may cease as a viable economic entity should a terrorist attack
occur at a game and cause significant casualties." 12 Put more bluntly,
the NFL, like similarly situated actors, likely "enjoys" a 0 margin of
error in preventing a terrorist attack on a game.
In response to such a daunting challenge, the NFL has imple-
mented a bevy of new security measures for games. These measures
include increased numbers of security personnel at all points in the
stadium, enhanced computer surveillance equipment, and stricter pro-
hibitions on items allowed into the stadium." 3 Collectively, these
measures are thought to promote deterrence, diminish opportunities
for terrorist strikes, and diminish tort liability in the event of an at-
tack. 114
More controversially, new NFL security measures also include
"pat-downs" of patrons before they enter the stadium. Pat-downs en-
tail the touching or patting of the outer garments, 1 5 and are usually
performed above the waist. 1 6 Pat-downs below the waist are less
common, although may occur if security personnel observe suspicious
bulges in the pocket areas. 17 Patrons found to be carrying suspicious
materials are detained while the police are summoned. 118 Patrons
who refuse the pat-downs are denied entrance. 9 Pat-downs became
official NFL policy in August 2005 when the league declared that "all
persons attending league games must be physically searched before
entering any of the venues where the games are played" with "the aim
being to prevent terrorists from carrying explosives into the stadi-
111. See Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 349, 351-52 (2003) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 352.
113. See Jared Wade, Safeguarding the Meadowlands, RISK MGMT., Dec. 2002, at 20.
114. See Legal Issues in Sports Security, supra note 105, at 357 (citing remarks by Wil-
liam Squires, Director of Operations, New Stadium Meadowlands); see generally Piccarello,
supra note 93 (describing role of tort liability in assessing ant-terrorist efforts by professional
sports teams).
115. Id. at 355.
116. Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076, 1078.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Legal Issues in Sports Security, supra note 105, at 357 (citing remarks by Wil-
liam Squires, Director of Operations, New Stadium Meadowlands).
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urns."'
12 0
The stated intent of pat-downs is based on long-standing interna-
tional use of pat-downs by security officials. Israeli security and mili-
tary personnel, for instance, routinely use them because suicide vests
may be obscured underneath terrorists' clothing.121 Others posit that
pat-downs are more likely to deter an attempted terrorist attack than
to intercede in one, since terrorists can still conceal material below the
waist or otherwise bypass questionably-trained security. 22 Unlike the
NFL, the NBA, Major League Baseball ("MLB"), and the National
Hockey League ("NHL") have not instituted stadium security policies
that require pat-downs.'
2 3
The use of pat-downs for NFL games has drawn fan protest and,
more recently, legal scrutiny. In Johnston v. Tampa Sports Author-
ity, 124 a Florida court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting offi-
cials at Raymond James Stadium-home of the Tampa Bay Bucca-
neers-from "mass suspicionless pat-downs" of persons entering the
stadium.125  The court reasoned that pat-downs violate the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the
Florida Constitution, both of which prohibit "unreasonable" searches
and seizures. 126 Significantly, and unlike security management opera-
tions found at some NFL stadiums, the Tampa Sports Authority is a
public entity for the purpose of planning and maintaining sports facili-
ties and is thus subject to constitutional scrutiny as a state actor. 127 In
granting the restraining order, Judge Perry A. Little concluded that
120. Tampa Sports Auth. v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076.
121. See Mowbray, supra note 100.
122. See Billy Witz, NFL's Tricks and Treats: 49ers are Just Horsing Around, DAILY
NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, Oct. 30, 2005, at S7; see also Sally Kalson, What will we Endure for
the Sake of Security?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2005, at A2 (citing remarks by
Barb Feige, director of the American Civil Liberties Union Pittsburgh office). The NBA,
however, encourages the use of pat-downs, along with other security measures. See Ray
Waddell, Safety, Security Top Priority Among Arenas, BILLBOARD, Aug. 9, 2003, at 43.
123. See e.g., Kalson, supra note 116 (citing remarks by Pittsburgh Pirates spokes-
woman Patty Paytas that Major League Baseball does not authorize pat-downs).
124. Case No. 05-09151 (13"' Jud. Court, Fla. Civil Division, Nov. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.aclufl.org/issues/national_security/Pat-DownPrelimlnjunction.pdf; affirmed,
Tampa Sports Authority v. Johnston, 914 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. App. 2005).
125. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40046 (M.D. Fla.,
Dec. 23, 2005).
126. 914 So. 2d at 1078-79.
127. See Case No. 05-09151 (Judge Little writing, "the TSA performs the pat-down
searches as a state actor ... [it] is a public agency"); see generally Websitefor Tampa Sports
Authority, http://www.tampasportsauthority.com/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
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protection against unreasonable searches outweighed any security
benefit, that patrons lacked a legal remedy for any harm caused by the
pat-down, and that the plaintiff was likely to succeed in his trial. 28
Equally significant, the NFL failed to supply evidence demonstrating
that pat-downs actually work. In fact, the NFL has never tested their
effectiveness or compiled data revealing the frequency of patrons de-
tained and later arrested. 29 One media report even asserts that pat-
downs in NFL games have not led to the discovery of a single item of
contraband, let alone terrorist material. 1
30
Despite Johnston, the NFL preserved its pat-down policy in
other stadiums for the remainder of the 2005 NFL season. Indeed, the
state court decision was only binding upon the Tampa Bay Authority,
and thus limited in application to home games played by the Tampa
Bay Buccaneers. Nevertheless, Johnston may have a lasting effect on
Buccaneers' home games,, as in July 2006, Judge James D. Whitte-
more of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida re-
fused to lift the the state court's injunction.' 3' While acknowledging
that "after September 11, 2001, Americans are justifiably more sensi-
tive to the need to protect against acts of terrorism," Judge Whitte-
more concluded that "a generalized fear of terrorism should not di-
minish the fundamental Fourth Amendment protections envisioned by
our Founding Fathers. Our Constitution requires more."'132
The plaintiffs success in Johnston could trigger similar claims
across the country. One has already emerged. In December 2005,
two San Francisco 49ers season ticket-holders filed a lawsuit in San
Francisco Superior Court alleging that the NFL pat-down policy at
49ers games violated their right to privacy under the California Con-
stitution. 133 As of this writing, Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers re-
mains in litigation.
128. See Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, Case No. 05-09151 (13thi Jud. Court, Fla.
Civil Division, Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.aclufl.org/issues/national_security/Pat-
DownPrelimlnjunction.pdf.
129. See Candace Rondeaux, Patdowns Halted-For Now, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
28, 2005, at 1B (citing remarks by Robert Hast, NFL director of event security).
130. See Daniel Ruth, Macarena Provides More Fan Security, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 10,
2005, at 2.
131. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52173 (M.D. Fla., July
28, 2006); see also Thomas W. Krause, Pat-Down Case Stays in Federal Dominion, TAMPA
TRIB., Dec. 24, 2005, at 6 (supplying background information on the federal appeal).
132. Id. at 44.
133. See Cicero A. Estrella, NFL's Pat-Down Policy Challenged, SAN. FRAN. CHRON.,
Dec. 15, 2005, at BI.
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Johnston and Sheehan have sparked spirited debate as to the ap-
propriate balance between "security" and "freedom" at NFL games.
Those opposed to pat-downs have queried why the NFL, unlike other
pro sports leagues, would utilize them and "whether the NFL trusts its
fans less than Major League Baseball or NASCAR, or is just more
paranoid."' 134  Other critics posit that pat-downs, as conducted by
sometimes less than engaged, less than well-trained security person-
nel, prove "jokingly" ineffective 135 and merely manifest a "feel-good"
measure that deludes fans into overestimating the NFL's concern for
their safety. 136  Additional critiques contend that pat-downs may
cause public humiliation,137 and by requiring a group of people to
wait in line, might unwittingly spawn a terrorist target outside of the
stadium. 1
38
Critics of pat-downs also highlight judicial resistance to their use
in similar and arguably analogous settings. For instance, in State v.
Seglen,139 the Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled that a pat-down
policy at University of North Dakota hockey games violated the
Fourth Amendment. 140 The court reasoned that pat-downs are inher-
ently intrusive, and their use in airports and courthouses reflects a nar-
row exception to their general disfavor. 14 1  Courts addressing pat-
downs in other entertainment contexts have ruled similarly. For in-
stance, both the Supreme Court of Washington and the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas have ruled that pat-downs of
134. See Charles Kling, Letters to the Editor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at
2P.
135. See Greg Reeves, Welcome to Arrowhead: Spread 'em!, K.C. BLOGS, Sept. 13,
2005, at http://blogs.kansascity.com/crimescene/2005/09/welcome toarro.html (citing
comments from Kansas City Chiefs' fan "Michelle").
136. See Chris Graham, At What Price Security?, AUGUSTA FREE PRESS, Feb. 20, 2006,
at http://www.augustafreepress.com/stories/storyReader$39039 (citing remarks by security-
technology expert Bruce Schneier); see also David Whitley, NFL Too Cheap When it Comes
to Fans' Safety, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 9, 2005, at D l (contending that pat-downs are "de-
signed to make people feel better without addressing the actual problem," particularly given
the apparent indifference of those entrusted to pat-down).
137. See Airport Security, ABOUT.COM, available at http://terrorism.about.com/od
/protectingtargets/i/airportsecurity.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
138. See Graham, supra note 129 (citing comments by Rebecca Steele, director of the
ACLU of Florida's Tampa office).
139. 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005)
140. Id. at 708-09; see also Greg Skidmore, Pat Downs at Sports Arenas: Necessary
Precaution or Unconstitutional Search?, SPORTS LAW BLOG, Oct. 26, 2005, at http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2005/10/pat-downs-at-sports-arenas-necessary.html.
141. Id. at 708.
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rock concert patrons violate the Fourth Amendment. 142 Both courts
enunciated that pat-downs are appropriate only in exceptional circum-
stances, such as in ensuring the safety of airports and courts, which, in
some instances, could have used pat-downs to prevent specific acts of
violence. 1
43
Predictably, supporters of the NFL pat-down policy strike a dif-
ferent chord. Most obviously, they believe that pat-downs can pre-
vent or deter catastrophic terrorist strikes, and that the inconvenience
of a 3-to-5 second pat-down is therefore eminently tolerable. 144 A
correlative benefit appears to be the "peace of mind" that some pa-
trons internalize upon knowing that other patrons have been patted
down.' 45 The indiscriminate nature of the pat-downs has also been
mentioned as a positive. Perhaps surprisingly, an official at the
American Civil Liberties Union-an organization that has sponsored
the plaintiffs in Johnston and Sheehan-observed this particular bene-
fit. Barb Feige, director of the American Civil Liberties Union Pitts-
burgh office, reasoned "from a civil liberties standpoint, [patting-
down] is not an issue as long as they're doing it to everyone.' 46 In-
deed, unlike random searches in public settings, pat-downs are im-
posed upon all patrons and occur at games that are voluntarily at-
tended and that obviously comprise "unnecessary" activities. Most of
these same patrons also seem content with pat-downs: NFL atten-
dance rose in the 2005 season.
147
On balance, pat-downs at NFL games provide uncertain benefit,
and most fans do not appear troubled by either the pat-down or the
delay in entering the stadium, perhaps because they view their game
attendance as an optional life activity. Speculatively, a social-
psychologist might posit another explanation: NFL fans may be
evincing "duration neglect," or the tendency to undervalue or disre-
gard the duration of an experience when evaluating its unpleasantness
142. See generally Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (Wash.
1983); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
143. 658 P.2d at 655; 414 F. Supp. at 1362. Indeed, consider that pat-downs of the 9/11
hijackers may have uncovered their box-cutters.
144. See Mowbray, supra note 100; see also Reeves, supra note 128 (citing remarks by
Vicky Heston).
145. See Tom Perry, Pat-downs Help Fans Focus on Football, GREEN BAY PRESS-
GAZETTE, Sept. 21, 2002, at lB.
146. See Kalson, supra note 116.
147. See Heads Up: What We're Talking About this Week, SEATTLE-POST INTELLI
GENCER, Jan. 9, 2006, at C2.
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or deciding among future experiences. .48 Interestingly, individuals
tend to prefer experiences with adverse, yet static effects over experi-
ences of the same duration with preferable, yet worsening effects. 149
To illustrate, in an experiment conducted by Professors Charles A.
Schreiber and Daniel Kahneman, respondents were asked to rank two
circumstances: 20 seconds of a displeasing drilling noise that main-
tained a constant intensity of 75 decibels, or 20 seconds of the same
noise that gradually increased in intensity from 0 decibels to 75 deci-
bels. 150 Although the former choice would appear to be "worse"-the
drilling remains at the highest decibel throughout-most respondents
regarded it as preferable.'
51
Along those lines, perhaps fans prefer to wait in long lines for an
uncomfortable, yet certain pat-down over waiting in a faster-moving
line that or may not yield a pat-down. One stadium expert corrobo-
rates this deduction.152  If verifiable in the aggregate, such a phe-
nomenon would suggest that leagues and teams might enjoy greater
autonomy with universally applied security measures than with those
applied discriminately. 153  Considering the prospective reduction in
tort liability supplied by stringent security measures, enhanced auton-
omy may emerge as economically beneficial.
Leagues, teams, and fans are not the only sports actors affected
by increased attention to terrorism. Based on their commentary, pro-
fessional athletes are also worried by it. Unsurprisingly, their con-
cerns were most detectable in the immediate aftermath of the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.' 54  Perhaps more interesting, my
research identified only one player who has enunciated either a pref-
148. See Clinton T. Christensen, Memory and Choice (Thesis), at 1, available at
http://dscholarship.lib.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=undergrad (last vis-
ited, Aug. 26, 2006).
149. Id.
150. See Charles A. Schreiber & Daniel Kahneman, Determinants of the Remembered
Utility ofAversive, 129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH., 27-42 (2000).
151. Id.
152. See Kelly Ettenborough et al, Fans Unfazed by Security Despite Increased Efforts,
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 2002, at 1B (citing remarks by Bill Terrance, a supervisor with
MVP Events, an event management and security company in Scottsdale, Arizona).
153. Empirical research is obviously needed to validate such a deduction.
154. See e.g., Tom Timmerman, Security at Sports Venues Gets More Scrutiny, ST.
Louis DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2001, at 5 (citing concerns by St. Louis Rams player Ernie Con-
well about players' vulnerability to a terrorist attack at a stadium); John Henderson, Even as
Professionals, Baseball Players Share Emotional Turmoil, DENVER POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at
C06 (citing remarks by players on the Colorado Rockies and Arizona Diamondbacks about
how they were emotionally affected by the 9/11 attacks).
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erence for playing in a presumptively safe locale or an aversion to
playing in a locale considered more vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
155
In other words, players do not seem to feel, or at least acknowledge a
concern that, for instance, playing for teams in New York City or
Washington D.C.-arguably the two American cities most vulnerable
to a terrorist attack' 56-may prove less safe for themselves and their
families. This viewpoint contrasts with the views of many Ameri-
cans, who, because of terrorism, consistently express trepidation
about living in New York City or Washington D.C. 157 (even though,
as reflected in rising and often astronomical housing costs, both cities
remain coveted places to live). 158
The reticence of players to acknowledge "safety concerns" may
155. In explaining her decision to play for a team in Ramat Gan, Israel, rather than re-
turning to play in New York City, professional basketball player Simone Edwards stated, "I'm
more scared of being in New York than being in Israel." See Jayda Evans, Basketball in Is-
rael: Storm Players Soak it Up Tomorrow, SEATTLE TIMES, May 28, 2002, at D1.
156. See Daniel Hays, Will TRIA Extension Vote go to the Wire?, PROPERTY & RISK,
Sept. 20, 2004 (citing expert opinion that New York and Washington D.C. are considered
more likely to be attacked than other American cities, and that is reflected in higher insurance
rates for property in those two locations); Mark Leibovich & Roxanne Roberts, Ready or Not?
A Capital Question, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2003, at C01 (citing government officials who
claim that New York and Washington D.C. are considered more likely targets than other
American cities); but see Danger Lurks Within America's Boarders, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Sept. 12, 2005, at 8A (Editorial) (claiming that "[a]uthorities say domestic terrorists are more
likely to target a Midwestern city than New York or Washington").
157. See e.g., New York Times/CBS News Poll, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Aug. 8, 2002-Aug.
25, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/nyregion/20020911 POLL/
02091 lpoll-results.html (Question 9 citing feelings among New Yorkers that they believe
New York is more likely to be a terrorist target than other American cities); CBS News/New
York Times Poll: New York City: Nine Months Later, CBS NEWS.COM, June 10, 2002, at
http://www.ebsnews.com/stories/2002/06/l0/opinion/polls/main511729.shtml (citing various
poll data demonstrating fear of terrorists striking New York City again); A Tale of Two Cities,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/printedition
/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=1328844 (citing a decline in percent of New Yorkers who want
to continue to reside in New York City); Jose Martinez & Tracy Connor, Confusion over Alert
for Apartments, DAILY NEWS, May 22, 2002, at 4 (citing comments from Manhattan resident
Paul Hoppe: "Living in New York, you know there's a certain risk involved. You just sort of
learn to accept that"); Anne Neville, Aftershock, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 11, 2002, at DI (citing
remarks from person who moved away from D.C. because of the stress of living and working
in D.C. pertaining to worry about a terrorist attack).
158. As of October 2005, Manhattan was the most expensive city to live in the United
States, with Washington D.C. the fifth most expensive. See Les Christie, Priciest U.S. Cities,
CNN MONEY, Oct. 25, 2005, at http://money.cnn.tv/2005/l0/18/real estate/buy-
ingselling/most expensiveplaces/index.htm; see also Patrice Hill, Region Joins Housing
Bubble, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at AOl (noting that Washington area home prices surged
24 percent from 2003 to 2004, twice the national rate and the fourth straight year of double-
digit gains, and that since the late 1990s, home prices have doubled in northern Virginia and
many other parts of the Washington area).
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reflect assorted phenomena. Most apparently, some players may sim-
ply not harbor fears about playing for teams in New York City or
Washington D.C. Such a deduction would not be irrational, as terror-
ists could obviously strike any locale, and recent security observations
suggest that the threat to "unsuspecting" locales is far greater than is
commonly presumed.159 In fact, in justifying the dispersed funding
provisions of the Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2006 Funding Bill,
U.S. Rep. Mark E. Souder, a senior member of the Homeland Secu-
rity Committee, reasoned "terrorists could strike anywhere-not just
in New York or Washington."' 60  As a result, a player may simply
perceive a risk playing anywhere, and since it is impossible to know
which city the terrorists are targeting, a player may be indifferent to-
wards the risk of terrorism relative to locale.
Then again, since many in the general population believe that
New York and Washington D.C. are relatively "risky" places, it
stands to reason that a similar proportion of players should feel simi-
larly; there is no evidence to suggest that players are somehow
uniquely enlightened or more informed about the risk of terrorism.
16
'
Suggestively then, some players may be withholding their actual feel-
ings about the risk of terrorism. Such reticence may be explained by
assorted hypotheses.
For instance, gender roles may be pertinent: some male athletes
may be genuinely worried about security, but admitting as much
might conflict with social expectations for traits commonly attribut-
able to male athletes, such as "tough" or "macho." Put more bluntly,
athletes may fear "looking like a wimp" should they even hint at "be-
ing afraid."
Sociological findings appear to substantiate this deduction. As
explained by sociologist Bruce Kidd, the "range of masculinities in
sports. . . is subordinated in public discourse and institutional expec-
159. See e.g., David E. Sanger, Antiterrorism Officials Reveals New Details, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at AI I (noting that purported terrorist attack of Los Angeles was part of a
"larger plan" on September 11, 2001 to attack both coasts, and not solely New York and
Washington D.C.).
160. See Homeland Security FY 2006 Funding Bill Passed by House, US FEDERAL
NEWS, May 17, 2005, available at Westlaw All News. This practice of dispersed funding has
drawn criticism for providing rural, less-populated areas with a "disproportionate amount of
money." See e.g., Veronique de Rugy, Are We Ready for the Next 9/11?, 37 REASON 24 (stat-
ing, "[t]he theory underlying the grant distribution formula is that terrorists could strike any-
where. That's true. But not every target is equally likely or equally important. By trying to
protect us everywhere, Congress ensures that we're adequately protected almost nowhere.").
161. See generally McCann, It's Not About the Money, supra note 39.
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tation to a single dominant or hegemonic masculinity, which is highly
competitive, technological, and homophobic.' 62 Similarly, empirical
research finds that sports tend to socialize males at a young age to
adapt certain characteristics, such as "competition, toughness, and
winning at all costs, which are culturally valued aspects of masculin-
ity. ''163  More broadly, American society tends to champion males
who exhibit "strength" while attributing less social status to males en-
gaged in introspective or unassuming behavior.' 64
Intriguingly, however, when assessing opportunities to play in
foreign locales, American professional athletes-both male and fe-
male-regularly express worry about terrorism. Their pattern of re-
neging on commitments to play abroad perhaps best evidences this
point. For instance, since 9/11, a group of professional female bas-
ketball players have backed out of contracts to play pro basketball in
Europe, 165 while one Major League Baseball player-Kevin Millar-
citied concerns about terrorism and a looming war in Iraq when re-
neging on a contract to play in Japan. 166  NFL player Bill Ferrario
conveyed similar reasons when opting out of playing in NFL
Europe. 167  Consonantly, NBA players Richard Hamilton and Ben
Wallace declined opportunities to play for the 2004 U.S. Men's
Olympic Basketball Team in Athens in part because of "safety con-
cerns."' 168 Others have responded to more direct and obvious stimuli.
162. See Bruce Kidd, The Men 's Cultural Centre: Sports and the Dynamic of Women 's
Oppression/Men 's Repression in MICHAEL A. MESSNER & DONALD F. SABO, SPORT, MEN,
AND THE GENDER ORDER: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 31 (1990).
163. See Michael A. Messner, Masculinities and Athletic Careers: Bonding and Status
Differences in MESSNER & SABO, supra note 155, at 97 (citing J. Lever, Sex Differences in the
Games Children Play, 23 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 478 (1976) & W.E. Schafer, Sport and Male Sex
Role Socialization. 4 SPORT SOCIOLOGY BULL. 47 (1975)).
164. See Julie Yuki Ralston, Geishas, Gays and Grunts: What the Exploitation of Asian
Pacific Women Reveals About Military Culture and the Legal Ban on Lesbian, Gay and Bisex-
ual Service Members, 16 L. & INEQ. J. 661, 665-66 (1998); Amy H. Kastely, Out of Whiteness:
On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law,
63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269, 300 (1994) (describing negative legal treatment of men who are
deemed "too weak in understanding or in will power").
165. See Omar Kelly, Terrorism Quelled Some Interest in Overseas Leagues, SUN-
SENTINEL, May 6, 2002, at 10C.
166. See David Dorsey, Security Expert Has Discussion with Twins, NEWS-PRESS, Mar.
20, 2003, at 1C. It should be noted that Millar's stated reason may have been pre-textual, as an
opportunity to play for the Boston Red Sox occurred after he signed the contract to play in Ja-
pan, but before he reported to his Japanese team.
167. See Rob Demovsky, War Kept Ferrario at Home, CAPITAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003,
at 2D.
168. See Brad Townsend, Athens 2004, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at 8;
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For instance, while playing professional basketball in Turkey,
Lindsey Yamasaki articulated a desire to leave the country immedi-
ately following a nearby terrorist attack. 1
69
The willingness of athletes to express fear of terrorism in foreign
but not domestic locales may reflect various possibilities. This be-
havior may, for instance, embody informed deliberation: a number of
European countries have suffered repeated terrorist attacks, and the
Olympics have traditionally been considered a coveted target of ter-
rorists. 170  Put differently, American athletes may justifiably regard
those venues as more dangerous than venues found in the United
States and thus male athletes exhibiting "fear" toward them may ap-
pear less dissonant with the male athlete archetype. The recognition
that many athletes have young families only strengthens the presumed
rationality of avoiding foreign and presumptively more dangerous lo-
cales.
This juxtaposition of willingness may perhaps also reflect nor-
mative pressures for group conformity, with "group" in this instance
embodying the American citizenry and its nationalistic ideals. In this
post 9/11 era, patriotism and patriotic expression have constrained the
boundaries of individualism, thus compelling greater ascription to
group norms. 17 1 Among these norms is one which dictates, in sum
and substance, "we can't live in fear or the terrorists have won"' 172
see also Lacy J. Banks, Don't Count on a Dream Team in Athens, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 16,
2004, at 101 (citing possibly concerns by NBA players and expressly-stated concerns by NBA
officials and owners and about NBA players partaking in the 2004 Olympics); Mike Lucas,
Penney Hopes for Longer Spell in NBA, CAPITAL TIMES, June 4, 2004, at 1D (citing remarks
by New Zealand Basketball player Kirk Penney and his concern for safety in playing in the
2004 Olympic).
169. See Jerry Ulmer, Yamasaki's 'Normal' Summer is Anything but Normal for Her,
OREGONIAN, July 15, 2004, at 7. Yamasaki was playing in Adana, while the terrorist attack
occurred in Istanbul. Id
170. See Joanne Wright, Incidents Involving Terrorist Attacks (Pan-Europe), CHARLES
DARWIN UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM SERIES, at http://www.cdu.edu.au/cdss2003/pa-
pers/Sym3Papers/Appendix 1-joannewright.pdf (detailing terrorist attacks and attempted terror-
ist attacks in Europe from 2001 to 2003); Jared Wade, Ready or Not, Olympic Terrorism, RISK
MANAGEMENT, Aug. 1, 2004, at 12 (supplying background on terrorism and the Olympics);
see also Hans de Vreij, At least 15 foiled terrorist attacks in Europe since 9/11, RADIO
NETHERLANDS, Feb. 18, 2005, at http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/re-
gion/westerneurope/ter050218 (noting how European authorities have thwarted 15 "mass
casualty attacks" in Europe since September 11, 2001).
171. See Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 367, 373 (2004).
172. See e.g., Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and
the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 564 (2004); see also
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(which we will call the "fear aversion norm"). This norm has encour-
aged citizens to maintain their pre-9/1 1 routines and daily activities,
such as opening mail, 173 flying on airplanes,1 74 and riding on sub-
ways. 75  For professional athletes, perhaps the fear aversion norm
further dissuades them from acknowledging apprehension of terror-
ists. Indeed, social psychologists find that the more an individual
conforms to perceived norms, the more likely he will be considered
estimable by members of his group. 176 In contrast, when an individ-
ual fails to adhere to norms, he runs the risk of social sanction or the
withholding of certain social benefits. 1
77
Particularly given both the media spotlight on them and the na-
tionalistic leanings of many sports fans, 1 78 professional athletes might
be wary of violating the fear aversion norm, as doing so may inflict
substantial harm on their reputation and earning capacity. 179  Even
Transcript from CNN The Point with Greta Van Susteren, CNN.COM, Dec. 4, 2001, available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/04/tpt.00.html (quoting Los Angeles
Mayor James Hahn: "we can't let the terrorists win by giving up the freedoms that America
provides for all of us. And if we crawl into a hole, then that will only help the terrorists think
that they've really achieved a much greater victory than they have.").
173. See e.g., Kathy Lauer-Williams, Anthrax Fears Lessen at Post Office, MORNING
CALL, Oct. 16, 2002 (citing remarks by Mary Turner, resident of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania).
174. See e.g., Anne C. Mulkem, Travel Agents Given a New Reason to Worry, DENVER
POST, Nov. 13, 2001, at A09 (citing remarks by Terry Boyd, resident of Denver, Colorado);
David Westerfield, Airline Woes Hit Home, TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 11 (citing remarks by air-
plane pilot Jimmy Hudgens of Nashville, Tennessee).
175. See e.g., Dave Goldiner, Fear, But "I Have to Work, " DAILY NEWS, July 8, 2005,
at 8 (citing remarks by Erin Shaffer, resident of Manhattan, New York).
176. See Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the
Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) [hereinafter, Geisinger, Are
Norms Efficient?]
177. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1,
3 (2001).
178. See Importance of Sports in Political Campaigns, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Day
to Day program), Apr. 24, 2004, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire (citing remarks by poll-
ster John Zogby that sports fans vote like gun owners church goers, while people who don't
like sports "are less likely to attend a place of worship frequently, less likely to own a gun,
more likely to have attended college or beyond, more likely to be a member of what some
folks call the creative class."); see also MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE MEANING OF SPORTS
128-143 (2004) (explaining that fans' interest in football reflects both the human instinct for
warfare and the common male fixation with military strategies); DANIEL L. WANN ET AL.,
SPORT FANS: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF SPECTATORS 185-86 (2000) (dis-
cussing Real's study, which found that "professional football resonates strongly with Ameri-
can spectators because it elaborates upon society's most elemental themes (e.g., heroic arche-
types, material well-being, and corporate management), speaking to them in the terms of
cultural myths that they clearly understand and embrace.".(citing Michael Real, Super Bowl:
Mythic Spectacle. 25 J. COMM. 31-43 (1975))).
179. For instance, it is thought that the refusal of Carlos Delgado, a major league base-
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those players inclined to disclose their apprehensiveness are affected
by the tendency of individuals to transform their judgments to that of
the group.' 80 This behavioral manifestation reflects the normalizing
of emotions during "social conformity," the process in which beliefs
and positions are modified to comport with group surroundings.'
8 1
Cognitive errors may also help to explain the situational reti-
cence of professional athletes. For instance, informational deficien-
cies and time constraints may encourage athletes, like most persons,
to make inferences about the safety of foreign lands from small and
unrepresentative sample sizes. 182 Indeed, we might only observe for-
eign cities through media and other impersonal, perhaps hyperbolized
channels. Moreover, the fundamental attribution error suggests that
our observations-and corresponding attitudes, cognitions, emotions,
and behaviors-are most affected by dramatic situational happen-
ings.183 For that reason, our attention to news tends to be most acute
when the news is striking, such as with a terrorist attack or a natural
disaster, meaning to the extent the media gravitates toward negative
news, our impression of foreign lands may be tainted negatively.
184
As a result, terrorism abroad may seem worse than it actually is, and
athletes may thus view opportunities to play abroad as less desirable
than objective data would suggest.
Knowledge structures may only exacerbate cognitive errors per-
taining to sample size. Knowledge structures are the "intuitive im-
plements"' 85 that facilitate social understandings and engender social
ball player, to stand during the singing of "God Bless America" negatively hurt his perception
in baseball, and potentially harmed his endorsement opportunities. See Sam Borden, A Man of
Principle, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 23, 2005, at 72.
180. See Gregory S. Berns et. al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and
Independence during Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 245-53 (2005).
181. Id.
182. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-
Bias Canons as a Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MtNN. L. REV. 363, 403 (2000) (dis-
cussing significance of small sample size in forming conclusions). Informational deficiencies
have been documented in other settings. For instance, law enforcement officers regularly
make conclusive judgments of guilt on the basis of only one or two witness interviews. See
Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal
Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L., 765, 767 (1995).
183. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 1.
184. See e.g., Reliable Sources, CNN TRANSCRIPTS, Oct. 30, 1994, available at
Lexis/Nexis News Wire (quoting Professor Kathleen Hall Jamieson: "The press, which gravi-
tates toward the negative... ").
185. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 18 (1980); see also Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient?,
supra note 169, at 22 (discussing empirical evidence of editorial choices in news presentation
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judgments. 186 Because the human mind cannot assess every piece of
information encountered at every moment, knowledge structures al-
low it to behave as a "cognitive miser," thus directing attention to the
most obvious stimuli available. 187 Constructively, knowledge struc-
tures enable us to interpret and classify the myriad stimuli (e.g., ob-
jects, experiences, ideas, people, and behavior) apparent at any mo-
ment;1 88 without them, we would be unable to administer and take
meaning from commonplace occurrences. 1
89
Furthermore, because they help the mind to interpret and classify
stimuli, knowledge structures engender beliefs, theories, and
schema. 190 Yet because they also simplify the world and trigger
"mental short cuts," knowledge structures can, and frequently do, en-
gender inaccurate belief systems. Most notably, knowledge structures
frequently lead persons to develop mistaken beliefs about groups of
persons, more typically described as "group stereotypes.,' 9' Empiri-
cal research has confirmed the role of group stereotypes in how
Americans tend to disparately regard the identical behavior of white
and black persons, 92 of high-socioeconomic and low-socioeconomic
persons, 193 and, of particular relevance to this analysis, of domestic
as affecting public perception).
186. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 430 (1999).
187. Id. at 23.
188. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 1, at 50-5 1; see also
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 770 (2000) (describing interplay between knowledge structures and schemas, with sche-
mas defined as "knowledge structures that are comprised of assumptions, expectations, and
generic prior understandings").
189. See Kunda, supra note 179, at 17; see also David McGraw, How Do Readers
Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH. U.L. REV. 81, 101 (offering linguistic
analysis of how knowledge structures provide meaning to words and symbols).
190. Id.
191. See Nisbett & Ross, supra note 178, at 35; see also Antony Page, Batson's Blind-
Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Preemptory Challenge, 85 B.U L. REV. 155, 192-95
(2005) (describing role of knowledge structures in formation of racial stereotypes); Jody Ar-
mour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit,
83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 749-50 (observing knowledge structures as a mode of explaining cog-
nitive structures and racial beliefs).
192. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 1, at 53, discussing
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, at xiii (1954) (studying reaction to ex-
perimental interaction between two men, with men varying in role and race, and with one man
pushing the other); see also Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 53 AM.
U.L. REV. 1259, 1290 (discussing role of "unconscious racism" in how behavior is perceived).
193. Id. discussing John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in
Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 20, 25 (1983).
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and foreign persons.' 
94
A group stereotype of foreign peoples is sometimes described as
"xenophobia," or a fear of foreigners and their society.195 Xenopho-
bia has been detected in the setting of terrorism. For instance, follow-
ing the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, where 168 people were killed,
most of the American public thought that Middle Eastern terrorists
were responsible.' 96  Alarmingly, and particularly for a democratic
society, this default assumption "had the potential to intensify anti-
immigrant, xenophobic, and isolationist tendencies."' 97  In less dra-
matic instances that pertain to terrorism, xenophobia may have been
detectable in recent opposition to the Dubai shipping deal,' 98 or in op-
position to foreign companies which seek to influence domestic radio
and televised broadcasts. 199 It may also be salient in the current de-
bate over immigration policy and the United States-Mexico border.
200
Like all group stereotypes, xenophobia is exacerbated by the
tendency to ask questions about whether there is evidence to confirm
the belief and forgetting to ask whether there is evidence that would
disconfirm it. 20 1  Social psychologists characterize this tendency as
"confirmation bias," or the proclivity to ignore or discount informa-
tion that challenges existing beliefs.20 2 Confirmation bias has been
194. See Evan C. Zolden, Strangers in a Strange Land: Domestic Subsidiaries of For-
eign Corporations and the Ban on Political Contributions from Foreign Sources, 34 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 573, 621 (2003).
195. See Irene Scharf, Tired of Your Masses: A History of and Judicial Responses to
Early 20th Century Anti-Immigrant Legislation, 21 HAWAII L. REV. 131, 135-36 (1999).
196. See Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 293, 303 (2003).
197. Id. citing Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Oklahoma City Bombing: Oklahoma
City Terror May Intensify Hard-Line Views on Crime and Immigration, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
1995, at A12.
198. See Heather Timmons & Leslie Wayne, U.S. Businesses Are Lining Up Behind Du-
bai, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at 3.
199. See Vincent M. Paladini, Foreign Ownership Restrictions under Section 310(b) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 369-70 (1996).
200. See e.g., Bill Hendrick, Perspectives on Immigration: Carlos del Rio, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Mar. 29, 2006, at 3F (citing remarks by Dr. Carlos del Rio, associate professor of
medicine at Emory University School of Medicine).
201. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 1, at 54; see also
Cheryl B. Preston, Baby Spice: Lost Between Feminine and Feminist, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 541, 590 (explaining the pursuit of confirming evidence of group stereotype
in setting of females in the workplace).
202. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 630, 647-50 (1999). A corollary to con-
firmation bias is "self-serving" or "egocentric" biases, whereby individuals interpret informa-
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evidenced in corporate executives 203 and significantly in professional
athletes, who after enjoying a positive experience with a team, tend to
favorably interpret ambiguous information and to dismiss negative in-
formation about that team.20 4 Consequently, it is possible that some
professional athletes, like some persons, harbor xenophobic stereo-
types about foreign peoples, and thus likewise suffer from confirma-
tion bias in automatically pursuing and disproportionately emphasiz-
205reut
ing evidence that supports those stereotypes. As a result, a
situational fear of terrorism may reflect both underlying belief sys-
tems and cognitive errors in how those belief systems are applied.
Two other heuristical devices may be relevant and worthy of fu-
ture exploration. The "endowment effect," or tendency of individuals
to perceive more utility from their current state of affairs than from
altered and equivalent circumstances, might motivate professional
athletes to prefer to remain in the United States. It can do so by dis-
torting their perception of the associable advantages and disadvan-
tages in playing abroad.20 6 Second, professional athletes may suffer
from optimism bias when considering the risk of terrorism in domes-
tic playing opportunities (i.e., they are aware of a general risk of ter-
rorism, but assume it is less likely as it applies to them), yet suffer
from pessimism bias when considering that risk in foreign playing
opportunities.
2°7
tion in a way that disproportionately favors their own position. Unlike confirmation bias,
however, self-serving or egocentric biases are likely consciously present. See Chris Guthrie,
Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, n. 199 (noting
that these biases may increase plaintiffs' risk in seeking frivolous litigation); see also Linda
Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving
Biases, It J. ECON PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997) (discussing the impact of self-serving biases on
settlements).
203. See Lynne L. Dallas, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders
and Other Stakeholders?: The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Di-
rectors, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1363, n. 146 (2002).
204. See Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money, supra note 39, at 1545-47 (de-
scribing contractual decision-making of Jermaine O'Neal and in relation to his decision to re-
sign with the Indiana Pacers in 2003).
205. See Kunda, supra note 179, at 111-15, 123-30.
206. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining
Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 802-03 (2004); see also Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (supply-
ing findings that confirm the prevalence of endowment heuristics); Russell Korobkin, Policy-
making and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation,
46 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1994) (discussing endowment heuristics in the context of negotiations).
207. I was unable to identify documented presence of such a paradoxical effect in this
and in other settings, but it would make for a fascinating analysis. The presence of optimism
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In sum, professional sports leagues, teams, fans, and players re-
spond to the threat of terrorism in both predictable, presumptively
"rational" ways and in unpredictable behaviors that seemingly mani-
fest cognitive errors, social norms, and situational influences. More
consistent is the larger implication of their responses: professional
sports are deeply affected by both terrorism and the threat of terror-
ism, and, like other industries, struggle to find the appropriate balance
between security and freedom. Likewise similar to other settings,
professional sports appear highly vulnerable to external social devel-
opments and likewise dependent on continued protection of the home-
land.
IV. COMMUNICABLE DISEASE AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
The final section of this article queries perhaps the most frighten-
ing threat to professional sports and, indeed, all of mankind: an out-
break of a highly communicable and lethal disease. This threat has
received considerable attention in recent months as the A (H5N 1) vi-
rus (more commonly known as the "Avian Flu" or the "Bird Flu") has
spread from Asia to Europe. Fears persist that it will soon afflict
birds in the United States;20 8 more worrisomely, it may mutate into an
easily transmittable, human-to-human strain. 20 9 Aside from the Bird
Flu, scientists are troubled by the overprescription of antibiotics, with
strains of various bacteria becoming increasingly resistant to existing
medicines. 210 Insufficient supplies of vaccines also strike fear in pub-
lic health officials. 21' These fears resonate with the general public, as
evidenced by public opinion polls that confirm prevalent unease to-
bias and domestic terrorism has been studied. See e.g., Feigenson, supra note 57. But I have
not found it studied in the context of terrorism that happens abroad, or its interplay with opti-
mism bias and domestic terrorism.
208. See Dan Mitchell, Betting on Bird Flu, N.Y. TIMES, at 5; Lara Jakes Jordan, Migra-
tion May Bring Fatal Type of Bird Flu, STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 10, 2006, at 6 (citing comments
by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff that the bird flu may hit the United States
by May 2006).
209. See generally Brendan M. O'Malley, Merck v. Integra: A Safe Harbor for the
Commercial Use of Biotechnology Research Tools?, 23 CARDOZO L.J. 739, 739-42 (2006);
Elizabeth Rosenthal, Recent Spread of Bird Flu Confounds Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006,
at 6.
210. See Overuse of antibiotics causing severe illness and fatalities in U.S.and Canada,
HEALTH FACTS, Jan. 1, 2006, at 4; Michael D. Lemonick, Guerrilla Warfare, TIME, Fall 1996
(special issue: The Frontiers of Medicine), at 58.
211. See Sabin Russell, Statewide Flu Plan for Public Input, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Jan.
19, 2006, at B 1 (citing report by the California State Department of Health).
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wards a potential endemic, 212 and by popular books and films that
portray doomsday outbreaks (e.g., "28 Days Later," "Dawn of the
Dead," "The Stand").
At first glance, it appears unnecessary and perhaps nonsensical
to study how a pandemic would affect professional sports. Aside
from the obvious deduction that most sporting events would be can-
celed, sports would quickly recede from our attention and likely be-
come mere trivial memories from a better time. Put another way,
whether the Red Sox or Yankees have a better pitching staff or
whether Barry Bonds used steroids would suddenly seem a lot less
important if everyday, person-to-person contact were jeopardized.
All pandemics are not the same, however, and not all lead to
apocalyptic endings. For that reason, this section considers confined
"outbreak" scenarios that could jeopardize professional sports, such
as the threat of a looming pandemic in the United States or a pan-
demic occurring in other countries. Neither the threat of a looming
pandemic nor a pandemic occurring elsewhere requires much imagi-
nation, as both emerged just three years ago with a global outbreak of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ("SARS"). SARS is a viral res-
piratory illness derived from a coronavirus, a genus of animal virus
that primarily infects the upper respiratory and gastrointestinal
213tract. Coronaviruses are the second leading cause of the common
cold in human adults, and are spread through person-to-person con-
214tact. Unlike most coronaviruses, SARS impairs both the lower and
upper respiratory tracts and inflicts a mortality rate of approximately
212. See e.g., Dalia Sussman, Poll: Most Worried about Bird Flu, But Confident About
Government Response, ABC NEWS POLLING, Mar. 12, 2005, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/AvianFlu/storyid=1701213 (reporting that 66 percent of
Americans are worried about the Bird Flu); While Concerned, Most Americans Do Not Expect
Widespread Human Cases of Avian Flu in the Next Year, HARV. SCHOOL PUBLIC HEALTH
POLLING, Feb. 23, 2006, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
press/releases/press02232006.htmI (finding that 57 percent of Americans are concerned about
the potential spread of bird flu in the United States).
213. See Basic Information about SARS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, May 3, 2005, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm; Fang
Li et al., Structure of SARS Coronavirus Spike Receptor-Binding Domain Complexed with Re-
ceptor, 309 SCIENCE 1864 (2005).
214. See Definition of Coronavirus, MEDICINE NET.COM, at
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=22789 (last visited, Aug. 26, 2006);
Alan L. Bisno, Acute Pharyngitis: Etiology and Diagnosis, 97 PEDIATRICS 949, 954 (1996)
(supplying clinical information on coronavirus and the common cold); Stephanie J. Schrag et.
al, SARS Surveillance During Emergency Public Health Response, 2 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 185 (2004) (discussing challenge of SARS to public health).
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10 percent due to rapid progression and resistance to antimicrobial
therapy. 15
The SARS epidemic began in the Chinese Province of Guang-
dong in November 2002 and with the aid of intercontinental travel,
swiftly spread worldwide. 216  By the spring of 2003, it had appeared
in at least 28 countries, including the United States and Canada, and
infected persons were identified in five different continents. 217  By
May 2003, almost 8,500 persons were infected and 813 people had
died.218 The vast majority of infections and deaths occurred in China
and Hong Kong,219 although 27 Americans and 251 Canadians were
infected, and 43 of those Canadians died.220
Faced with a potential global pandemic, health and homeland se-
curity officials in affected countries resorted to various containment
policies. Many nations, for instance, resorted to travel restrictions or,
like the United States, travel advisories and travel alerts22 1 that dis-
couraged citizens from traveling to significantly afflicted nations.222
Perhaps most controversially, a number of countries (although
not the United States) 223 turned to quarantines, where masses of peo-
ple, many of whom are healthy but potentially exposed to a commu-
nicable containment, are isolated in a fixed area. In Toronto, for in-
stance, more than 14,000 people were quarantined under threat of a
215. Id.
216. See Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome is Focus of Review, L. & HEALTH
WEEKLY, Jan. 28, 2006, at 447.
217. See Jong-Wha Lee, Globalization and Disease: The Case of SARS, ASIAN
ECONOMIC PAPERS, Winter 2004, at 113.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See World Health Organization, Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of
illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003, available at
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004 04 21/en/index.html.
221. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, a travel advisory recommends
that non-essential travel to an area be postponed. In contrast, a travel alert does not advise
against travel to a particular area, but informs travelers of a health concern and provides advice
about precautions they can take to reduce their risk of exposure. See Office of Communication
at the Centers for Disease Control, CDC Reinstates Travel Alert for Toronto, May 23, 2003,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r030523.htm.
222. See e.g., SARS: CDC confirms Singapore is in the clear, MEDICAL LETTER ON THE
CDC & FDA, July 6, 2003, at 47.
223. Although a quarantine was never ordered in the United States, President George W.
Bush adds SARS to the list of "quarantinable diseases" in April 2004, thereby empowering the
CDC to isolate persons who might have been exposed to the disease. See SARS: Timeline of
an Outbreak, WEBMD, at http://www.webmd.com/content/article/63/72068.htm (last visited,
Aug. 26, 2006).
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$5,000 fine.224 These persons were ordered to isolate themselves at
home for 10 days, wear masks, avoid contact with household mem-
bers, and monitor themselves for symptoms of SARS.225 Other coun-
tries resorted to more onerous techniques: In China, death was the
maximum possible penalty for noncompliance, while in Taiwan and
Singapore, video monitoring of people quarantined at home was
common. 22 6 One study of SARS-related quarantines identified high
compliance, irrespective of nationality or quarantine style. 227 Most
quarantined persons cited civic pride, law-abidingness, and external
social pressures as spurring compliance.228 However, another study
found that SARS-related quarantines inflicted substantial emotional,
psychological, and financial hardship on those persons.2 29
Although uncertainty lingers as to whether quarantines and other
measures were clinically effective in containing SARS,23 ° infections
plummeted in the second half of 2003, and few infections have been
reported since that time. 1 For all intents and purposes, SARS has
"vanished" from Earth.232
The SARS epidemic supplies a useful mode of analysis for
studying professional sports in a setting of a looming pandemic that
contemporaneously afflicts foreign peoples. Indeed, SARS stirred far
more anticipatory fear than actual ailment in the United States, while
genuinely distressing those who weighed international travel. Such
an inquiry is especially engaging when considering the Toronto Blue
Jays, a Major League Team that played games in a SARS-afflicted
city, and featured players, media, and fans with ties to the United
States.
Before studying the Blue Jays, however, first consider the mag-
nitude of the crisis surrounding Toronto, the North American city
224. See Maureen A. Cava et al., Risk Perception and Compliance with Quarantine Dur-





229. See generally R.J. Blendon et al., The Public's Response to Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome in Toronto and the United States, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 925-931
(2004).
230. Id. For instance, in Toronto, only 27 formal quarantine orders were issued, mean-
ing the vast majority of the more than 14,000 persons quarantined willingly followed quaran-
tine "recommendations." Id.
231. See Jim Yardley, After Its Epidemic, SARS Vanishes, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2004.
232. Id.
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most affected by the virus. As intimated above when discussing
quarantines, SARS radically affected Toronto and its inhabitants.233
The virus first appeared in Toronto in March 2003;234 within two
months, it had claimed the lives of 21 residents and infected nearly
200 others.235 Although city leaders downplayed the outbreak,236 par-
ticularly since a mere fraction of a percent of the city's 5.2 million
residents were infected,237 they engaged in sweeping operational
changes, such as instituting quarantine policies and closing schools
after infected students were found to be in attendance. 38 Disturb-
ingly, some residents became the targets of "disease witch hunts."
Most notably, a college professor living in Toronto became the sub-
ject of front page headlines when suspicions arose about her flu-like
symptoms and her supposed capacity to "infect" students (she only
had the flu). 239 Taken together, while the actual threat of SARS to
Torontonians was extremely low, it elicited behavioral responses con-
sistent with a grave and impending hazard.
Foreign actors also responded with striking trepidation. For in-
stance, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control issued travel alerts to
Americans contemplating travel to Toronto,240 while the World
Health Organization ("WHO") expressly discouraged any non-urgent
travel to the city. 24 1 Corporate actors similarly avoided activity with
the city. Cruise lines, for instance, announced that they would not
233. See infra p. 39.
234. See SARS: Timeline of an Outbreak, supra note 216.
235. See Tatsha Robertson, Communities Suffer as SARS Fear Spread, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 5, 2003, at Al.
236. See e.g., Matt Porio, CDC Says Vigilance Needed on SARS, NEWSDAY, Apr. 30,
2003, at Al8 (citing remarks by Canadian public health officials who claimed that Toronto
was as safe as Paris, London, or Washington, D.C.).
237. See Thomas Brinkhoff, Populations for Canada Metropolitan Areas, CITY
POPULATION, available at http://www.citypopulation.de/Canada.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2006) (listing population of Toronto).
238. See SARS Kills 2 More in Toronto, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 2003, at 6 (detailing school
closing after two nearby residents died from SARS); Robert Ballantyne, Markham High
School Shut, 1,700- Quarantined, LONDON FREE PRESS, May 29, 2003, at A5 (discussing
school closing when student attended classes with SARS).
239. See Charles P. Pierce, Epidemic of Fear: How the SARS Scare Played into Amer-
ica's Culture of Panic and then, Just as Quickly, Faded from the Headlines, BOSTON GLOBE
MAG., June 1, 2003, at 10.
240. See Thomas H. Maugh, II, Toronto Fears New SARS Outbreak, L.A. TIMES, May
24, 2003, at 1.
241. See Shi Davidi, Blue Jay fans hope to send world a message by filling SkyDome,
Apr. 30, 2003, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire.
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take passengers from Toronto,242 while industry conferences and
school trips were cancelled, as were rock concerts and other enter-
tainment happenings. 243 Economists projected that Toronto lost up to
$30 million a day from canceled or unrealized business engage-
ments. 24
The circumstances in Toronto understandably altered operations
of the Toronto Blue Jays. However, despite calls for Blue Jays'
games to be canceled, the team elected to play all home games during
the outbreak.245 Blue Jays players publicly endorsed this strategy,
some quite vehemently. For instance, outfielder Vernon Wells opined
that playing the games would "show the rest of the world the truth
about Toronto. The scare is not as bad as it's been made out to be. 246
Third baseman Eric Hinske similarly remarked that the magnitude of
SARS in Toronto was "way blown out of proportion. We don't even
think about it. You have a better chance of catching the flu than
SARS. 24 7 Perhaps most revealingly, no Blue Jay publicly acknowl-
edged worry about contracting SARS through regular employment ac-
tivities.248
Some players on competing teams, however, appeared aghast at
the prospect of traveling to Toronto. For instance, Anaheim Angels
pitcher Kevin Appier suggested that Major League Baseball resched-
ule a series between his team and that of the Blue Jays because of
"people dying."249 Likewise, teammate David Eckstein worried, "it's
something that's very much unknown, and I think the unknown factor
is what is scary about it. You might come in contact with someone
242. See e.g., World Health Organization warns against traveling to Toronto, BEIJING
BECAUSE OF SARS, CNBC NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, Apr. 23, 2004, available at Lexis/Nexis
News Wire (citing Crystal Cruise Line's decision).
243. See SARS Deaths are on the Rise, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 30, 2003, available at
Lexis/Nexis News Wire; see also Kevin McGran, SARS Spooks Travelers to City, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 24, 2003, at D I (noting cancellation of conferences and school trips).
244. Id.
245. See Jays: Health Comes First, OTTAWA SUN, Apr. 25, 2003, at 99 (citing remarks
by Blue Jays president and CEO Paul Godfrey).
246. See Davidi, supra note 233.
247. See Cory Jennerjohn, Down But Not Out, OSHKOSH NORTHWESTER, May, 29,
2003, at 1D.
248. I was unable to find commentary from any player on the Blue Jays concerning
worry about the risk of contracting SARS by playing games or otherwise partaking in team
activities. A number of players expressed general reservations about living in Toronto, but
none spoke of a specific concern pertaining to their employment.
249. See Ben Bolch & Bill Shaikan, Toronto Trip is a Concern, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2003, at 1.
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who comes in the clubhouse and sneezes., 250  Specific events also
triggered suspicions: New York Yankees third baseman Todd Zeile
opined that teammate Derek Jeter, who had suffered a shoulder injury
in a game, might have been exposed to SARS when he was taken to a
Toronto hospital,251 while Kansas City Royals' outfielder Dee Brown
doused his Toronto hotel room with disinfectant, believing that doing
so would reduce the risk of infection.252
As other players conveyed unease at the prospect of traveling to
Toronto, MLB and the Major League Players Association dispatched
medical experts to meet with players and to inform them of how to
minimize the risk. Aside from stressing the extreme unlikelihood of
infection, they instructed players to regularly wash hands, avoid large
crowds, and only sign autographs using their own pens.25 3 Even after
these meetings, however, some players remained unconvinced. 4
This lingering suspicion led some teams to advise personnel with ex-
isting illnesses to stay in the United States, and players' families were
similarly discouraged from travel.255
Certain members of the out-of-town press corps also expressed
reservation or even spumed coverage assignments. For instance, Mi-
chael Smith, an ostensibly healthy, 23-year old reporter for the Boston
Globe, refused to travel to Toronto to cover a Red Sox-Blue Jays se-
ries. 6  He based his decision on the WHO's recommendation that
"unnecessary travel" to Toronto be avoided.257 Smith's decision
sparked criticism, particularly when he was compared to other report-




252. See Clifford Krauss, The SARS Epidemic: Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, at 19.
253. See Steven Krasner, Threat of SARS Taken Seriously, PROV. J.-BULL., May 29,
2003, at C05.
254. See Bolch & Shaikan, supra note 241 (citing remarks by Kevin Appier and Mike
Bordick of the Anaheim Angels).
255. For instance, Red Sox pitching coach Tony Cloninger, who was undergoing treat-
ment for bladder cancer, skipped a trip to Toronto because it was thought that his weakened
immune system would be more vulnerable to a SARS infection. See Krasner, supra note 245.
256. See Gaylee Fee & Laura Raposa, Inside Track, BOSTON HERALD, June 3, 2003, at
18 (discussing decision of Globe reporter Michael Smith to not attend games in Toronto); see
also Steve Silva, A Message to Michael, BOSTON DIRT DOGS, June 2, 2003, available at
http://www.bostondirtdogs.com/Headline%20Archives/DailyHeadlinesJune_2003.htm
(supplying Smith's age and other background information).
257. See Silva, supra note 248 (quoting Smith).
258. Id.; see also Fee & Raposa, supra note 238 (for additional critique).
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In theory, these unwilling actors manifested an "irrational fear."
Consider the profound unlikelihood of contracting SARS: in a nearly
three-month span, SARS infected 251 out of approximately 5,200,000
Torontonians (or about one out of every 20,700 Torontonians); it
killed 43 of those persons (or about one out of every 121,000 Toron-
tonians). Assuming, for the sheer sake of simplicity, that all of the
251 infected persons would have presented an active risk to ballplay-
ers and media, compare that risk with the probability of those actors
having succumbed to other ailments while remaining in the United
States. For instance, consider that each year approximately one out of
every seven Americans contracts the flu, 259 that one out of every
8,300 Americans dies from it, and that the flu is just as easily trans-
mitted as SARS.26 ° Or consider that the annual risk of suffering an
injury in the home that will necessitate medical attention is one in
13.261 Or consider that in most American homes, there is at least a 20
percent chance that the local water supply is not sufficiently chlorin-
ated to kill infectious bacteria.262 In other words, the players and me-
dia's risk of contracting SARS in Toronto probably paled in compari-
son to more common risks they undertook by remaining at or near
their homes.
Yet in practice, these actors behaved predictably and akin to the
behavior of many persons in that situation. Indeed, people tend to
suffer sudden and heightened fear of new or foreign risks.263  This
phenomenon has proven especially apparent at the onset of an infec-
tious disease threat. To illustrate, consider the reaction of many New
Yorkers to the arrival of the West Nile virus in the summer of 1999.
The mosquito-borne virus had never before been seen in the United
259. See Avoid the Flu Bug: Get Your Flu Shot Now!, UNIV. MICH. HEALTH UPDATE,
Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.med.umich.edu/opn/newspage/2004/hmflu.htm (noting
that between 25,000 and 50,000 Americans succumb to the flu each year).
260. See Worry vs. Reality: The Real Risks you Face, WEB MD, Feb. 18, 2004, at
http://medmutual.com/global/webmd/WebMDArticle.aspx?id=97245&aType=Senior (indicat-
ing that 36,000 Americans die from the flu each year) (calculation assumes 298,444,215
Americans, as indicated by the Central Intelligence Agency for July 2006, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2006)).
261. See Jeffrey Kluger, Risky Business: Risks of Everyday Hazards, DISCOVER, May
1996, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml51 l/is-n5_v17/ai_18199110
(last visited, Aug. 26, 2006).
262. Id.
263. See Dana Ziker, What Lies Beneath: An Examination of the Underpinnings of Die-
tary Supplement Safety Regulation, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 269, 275 (2005).
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States. Although it infected only 55 persons and killed seven,264 it
prompted panicked headlines and dire news accounts, such as the
New York Times which declared a "West Nile Epidemic., 265 Simi-
larly revealing, while the risk of dying in this "Epidemic" was less
than one in 1,000,000, residents demanded widespread spraying of
environmentally-compromising pesticides. 66 Yet by 2002, the virus
no longer seemed exotic, and while its risk of contraction remained
constant, it no longer generated widespread fear or overcautious be-
havior.267 Accordingly, the hesitancy of "foreign" players and media
to travel to Toronto seemingly comported to a predictive pattern of
situational behaviorism at the onset of an infectious disease outbreak.
The Blue Jays undertook preventative, although revenue-
conceding actions to ameliorate this "irrational" fear of SARS on fan
attendance. Most notably, the team discounted ticket prices from an
average of $20 to $1 or $2 and, particularly to attract out-of-town per-
sons interested in game attendance, offered massively-discounted
travel packages that included game tickets, theatre events, dinners,
and hotel accommodations. 268 Remarkably, game attendance actually
rose 19 percent during the SARS outbreak, 269 although revenue still
plummeted due to the severe markdowns.270
Aside from responding to obvious economic incentives in attend-
ing games, fans voiced a desire to combat stigma. Some held up
signs that declared "Catch the Ball, Not SARS," and "Toronto has All-
Stars not All-SARS, ' , 27 1 while others characterized their attendance as
discrediting ominous news stories and debunking admonitory travel
advisories. 272 Along those lines, Blue Jays President and CEO Paul
264. See Karen Charman, West Nile Attack, FAIR, Nov./Dec/ 2000, available at
http://www.fair.org/extra/00 11/west-nile.html.
265. See The West Nile Epidemic, Opinion Editorial, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002,
at 8.
266. See Charman, supra note 256.
267. See Kiker, supra note 255, at 275.
268. See Steve Erwin, SARS Outbreak Proves Costly to Jays, HAMILTON SPECTER, July
18, 2003, at E04; see also CP, Rogers Takes a Hit to Fill Skydome, BROCKVILLE RECORDER &
TIMES (Ontario, Canada), Apr. 29, 2003, at B2 (noting average ticket price of $20 and loss of
approximately $700,000 per game from ticket-price reduction plan)
269. See Joe Lapointe, Attendance Continues its Slow Slide, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 2003,
at D2.
270. See Erwin, supra note 260.
271. See CP, Sellout in Spite of SARS, FORT McMURRAY TODAY (Alberta, Canada),
Apr. 30, 2003, at B 1.
272. See e.g., Mark Zwolinski, Jays Fans Support City, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 2003,
at COI (interviewing fan Joe Moss).
WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW
Godfrey praised those in attendance for dispelling the "old-fashioned
leper colony" reputation that was gradually attaching to the city.
2 73
The enthusiasm of Blue Jays management, players, and fans to
counter external suspicions of Toronto appears corroborative of a
community effect, whereby salient social norms propel otherwise in-
dependent individuals to coalesce around a common cause.274 In this
instance, Toronto's survival was the animating common cause. Of
course, Torontonians may have also possessed self-identity concerns,
since persons associated with a stigmatized locale can themselves be-
come stigmatized.275 Nevertheless, the sense of community so appar-
ent during Blue Jays games intimates the power of surroundings in
directing individual behavior.
This power of surroundings is especially apparent when consid-
ering the "coercive power of situations" or situational power. 276 Situ-
ational power is frequently described as "situationism," the concept
that human behavior primarily reflects contextually-induced re-
sponses rather than individualized choices. Put another way, situa-
tionism is the idea that the surrounding situation-what out senses
perceive, both consciously and subconsciously-moves us more than
we move it. As revealed by social psychologists Stanley Milgram
277
and John Darley,278 situationism is especially apparent in group set-
tings, as group members tend to automatically endorse and mimic the
behavior of other members. Legal scholars, such as Jeffrey
Rachlinski and Howard Koh, have similarly described the "intense,
internal" pressures of individuals to conform to apparent community
expectations.279 Indeed, despite the popular assumption that individu-
als in democratic settings enjoy the "right" to free will and maximiza-
273. See Eli Shupak, Blue Jays' Paul Godfrey sees similarities between Toronto, Israel,
CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS, June 26, 2003, at 38.
274. See generally John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
"Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair, " 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1243
(1995).
275. See infra p. 10 (explaining courtesy stigma).
276. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1537,
1566 (2000).
277. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
278. See generally John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, "From Jerusalem to Jericho".- A
Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1973).
279. See Harold Hongju Koh, How to Influence the States: Internalization through So-
cialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975, 980-81 (2005); see generally Rachlinski, supra note 268, at
1566.
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tion of preferences, there exists considerable evidence that we are
deeply captured by the situation around us, and that it propels us in
often unappreciated ways.28°
Of course, the situational power of a community threatened by
an infectious disease does not necessarily posit socially-undesirable
behavior. When observing a SARS-afflicted Toronto, certain behav-
iors indeed warranted concern (e.g. disease witch hunts; demoralizing
and over-inclusive quarantines), yet one cannot but help to admire the
healing power of sports. Just consider how baseball games drew peo-
ple together, not only to dissipate fear of one another, but also to dis-
pel false assumptions about the city and its healthiness. In other
words, while situationism in crises may beget mixed behavior, per-
haps its application to professional sports accentuates the positive.
Yet how might professional sports actors have behaved had
SARS worsened or persisted, rather than subsided, over the summer
and fall of 2003? Consider the effect of that situation on MLB play-
ers. If the Blue Jays had continued to play their games with consent
from MLB, it stands to reason that some players would have refused
to travel to Toronto. Unsurprisingly, MLB and the Major League
Baseball Players' Association ("MLBPA") have collectively-
bargained language that requires players to report to games played by
their teams.281 A player's failure to do so can trigger a suspension,
during which time he would not be paid.282 Although common sense
suggests that MLB would have canceled or rescheduled games in the
event of an intensified SARS crisis or numerous players boycotting
travel,283 players would have otherwise risked significant financial
penalty by staying home.
280. See David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 923 (1996) (discussing presumptions of
American liberalism and unrestrained individual decision-making); see also Jon Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202-23 (2003) (exploring sali-
ence of deep capture on human thinking).
281. See e.g., 2003-2006 Basic Agreement, Schedule A, 6.(d), at 210, available at
http://www.businessofbaseball.com/docs/2002_2006basicagreement.pdf (last visited Aug. 26,
2006) (noting that a player must promptly report to his team during the season upon written
notice by the team).
282. See generally Id., Art. XII, at 41 (describing procedures for disciplining a player).
283. Indeed, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig assured players, media, and fans that games
at Toronto would be canceled or re-scheduled had SARS escalated in severity. See DeNeen L.
Brown, In Toronto, Fear Strikes Out, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2003, at A32; Etan Vlessing, To-
ronto SARS Fear Routs Canadian Cable TV Meet, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Apr. 25, 2003,
available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire.
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This hypothetical scenario would have also led some American
media to reconsider assignments to cover Blue Jays games or any
events in Toronto. Could they have refused those assignments and
still kept their jobs?
Relevantly, although the Boston Globe did not terminate the em-
ployment or otherwise sanction Michael Smith for refusing to cover a
Red Sox-Blue Jays series, it may have been within its legal rights to
do so. The Globe's capacity would have rested on whether Smith was
a member of the Newspaper Guild-Communication Workers of
America ("Guild"), a labor union for newspaper journalists and staff.
The Guild's contract provides that reporters may refuse assignments
if they reasonably believe that they would be risking death or serious
284injury. Considering that both the CDC and WHO had issued travel
warnings, and that Smith had reasoned his decision on those warn-
ings, his behavior would have likely been considered reasonable.
Therefore, if he was a Guild member, any sanction against him could
have triggered the filing of unfair labor practices charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.285 But if he was not a member, then he
would have only obtained the meager "protection" of at-will em-
ployment.286 Thus, from a practical standpoint, a reporter's member-
ship in the Guild would have largely calibrated his ability to refuse
Toronto assignments and not simultaneously endanger his employ-
ment.
As an alternative hypothetical, consider how a worsened SARS
pandemic in Asia might have affected professional sports actors. Cer-
tainly, professional sports teams would have been poised to cancel
scouting trips to Asia, thereby impairing player developmental inter-
ests. Similarly, any exhibition games scheduled there may have war-
ranted cancellation. Although obvious in light of the circumstances,
those decisions could have severely undermined efforts by American
pro leagues to attract Asian fans, particularly if local Asian media had
criticized those decisions as xenophobic.287
284. See Maine Event, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 2001, at 10.
285. See Jason P. Isralowitz, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and Constitu-
tional Values, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 221, 256-57 (1993) (explaining legal remedies for unionized
reporters).
286. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safe-
guarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2000) (noting that at-
will reporters can be fired without cause, provided it is not for a discriminatory purpose).
287. For a thorough review of efforts by the four major sports leagues to expand into the
Asian market and other foreign markets, see Frank Fitzpatrick, As International Players Ar-
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Other choices may have been more vexing. For instance,
American baseball players under contract to Japanese teams might
have been tempted to renege on their contracts and return home.
Their return to the United States would have presented MLB teams
with a contractual dilemma: Should they extend big-league or minor-
league contracts to players who were in breach of Japanese employ-
ment contracts? Such an scenario has never occurred, but according
to the United States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement,288
("Agreement") an agreement signed by MLB and Japan's Nippon
Professional Baseball ("NPB") league in 1998, an MLB team must
receive permission from the NPB in order to seek employment of a
player under contract to a Japanese team, and if granted, the player
would then be "posted" and bid on by all MLB teams.289 A literal in-
terpretation of the Agreement would therefore have restrained teams
from directly employing Americans players who were in breach of
Japanese employment contracts.
On the other hand, those players may have argued that SARS
triggered a contractual impossibility, which legally sanctions breach.
Contractual impossibility dictates that a party should not held liable
for breach if it was caused by an unforeseeable and uncontrollable
impediment. 290 Similarly, frustration of purpose may have provided
relief, since significant factual changes (such as, perhaps, an infec-
tious disease outbreak) could have obliterated the employment con-
tract's meaning, as could have mutual mistake, which occurs when
both parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a
rive, Big 4 Tapping into Global Markets, PHIL. INQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2005, at 10.
288. See http://jpbpa.net/convention/2001 e.pdf; see also Casey Duncan, Stealing Signs:
Is Professional Baseball's United States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement Enough to
Avoid Another "Baseball War"?, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87 (2003) (supplying extensive
analysis on legal relationship between MLB and JPN); Krikor Meshefejian, The Global Reach
of America's Pastime: Antitrust Implications of the US-Japanese Player Contract Agreement,
J. Bus. L. SOC'Y, Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://iblsjoumal.typepad.com
/illinois business law soc/2005/10/the love of the.html (supplying an antitrust analysis of
relationship between MLB and JPN).
289. Id. As a separate point, the Agreement does not cover independent baseball
leagues, and teams in those leagues could presumably pursue such a player's employment ser-
vices.
290. See Mark B. Baker, "A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall" - Terrorism and Excused Con-
tractual Performance in a Post September lth World, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 14-16, 25-26
(2004); see also Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (1982) (describing potential for unjust costs if impossibility was
not recognized in certain contractual circumstances).
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basic assumption upon which they based their agreement.29'
However, those contractual defenses are typically difficult to es-
tablish, since courts are reluctant to equate unexpectedly difficult or
uncomfortable circumstances with impossible circumstances.
292
Similarly, courts are often weary of reconstructing what the parties
would have negotiated ex ante, as doing so risks more speculative as-
sessment than informed deliberation.293 Moreover, the presence of a
Japanese employer would have complicated jurisdictional matters,
thereby supplying American teams with another reason to avoid pur-
suing these players.294
Perhaps the best argument for these players would have con-
cerned contractual intent: the Agreement intends to govern American
teams that seek to employ players of Japanese ethnicity under contract
to Japanese teams, and not American players under contract to those
teams.295 While promising in theory, as the Agreement did not ex-
pressly or impliedly contemplate American players, such a line of
reasoning would have likely failed to overcome the other conceptual
and practical drawbacks of employing them.
As a final consideration, a heightened SARS outbreak in Asia
might have led to discrimination of Asian and Asian-American play-
ers on American teams. Professional athletes in America have long
291. See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush, and Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics
of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 383-87
(2002); see also Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 845-47 (2003) (explaining how courts and scholars
assess the economics of mutual mistake).
292. See e.g., Liner v. Armstrong Homes of Bremerton, 579 P.2d 367, 370 (Ct. Wash.
1978) (noting that "the mere fact that a contract's performance becomes more difficult or ex-
pensive than originally anticipated does not justify setting it aside"); Wilson v. Colorado Inter-
state Gas Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3665, *6 (stating that "a party has an extremely difficult
burden in trying to establish a frustration of purpose or commercial impracticability defense");
B. L. Ivey Constr. Co. v. Pilot Fire & Casualty Co., 295 F. Supp. 840, 845 (N.D. Ga. 1968)
(holding that "we do not think that defendant has borne the difficult burden imposed on him..
of showing mutual mistake").
293. See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract
Remedies, 43 HASTtNGS L.J. 1, 38-54 (1991); but see Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J.
1489, 1520 (remarking that "most academic commentary and case law support the remedies of
... impossibility").
294. See generally Keivn M. Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments:
Views from the United States and Japan, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2004); Akihiro Hironaka,
Jurisdictional Theory "Made in Japan": Convergence of U.S. and Continental European Ap-
proaches, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1317 (2004).
295. See Elliot Z. Stein, Coming to America: Protecting Japanese Baseball Players Who
Want to Play in the Major Leagues, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261, 264-65 (2005).
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been the target of racial and ethnic discrimination. Perhaps most no-
tably, the first African-Americans allowed to play in the MLB en-
dured harsh bigotry.296 Most commonly, they were ostracized by
teammates, heckled by fans, and recipients of death threats by strang-
ers. 297  Such bigotry was also apparent thirty years later, as when
Henry Aaron of the Atlanta Braves was poised to break Babe Ruth's
homerun record in 1974, he received numerous death threats and over
900,000 pieces of mail, many of which contained "vile, if not hostile"
messages. 298 Although less common and overt, racial discrimination
of African-American athletes persists today.29 9
Moreover, even though Asian governments contained SARS be-
fore it evolved into a widespread pandemic, and even though only 27
Americans contracted it (about one out of every 11 million Ameri-
cans), 300 SARS evoked marked discrimination of Asians and Asian-
Americans living in the United States. Consider findings from a re-
cent U.S. National Center for Infectious Diseases' study on how
SARS shaped American behavior:
During the SARS outbreak, some persons became fearful or sus-
picious of all people who looked Asian, regardless of their nationality
or actual risk factors for SARS, and expected them to be quarantined.
Some Americans did not understand that quarantine and isolation
practices appropriate for SARS-affected areas in Asia, where com-
munity transmission was a concern, were practices that were not ap-
propriate in the United States where the disease was not community
296. See Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially Hostile Environment, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287 (1996). On the other hand, by allowing African-American players to
obtain employment from MLB teams, MLB was considered one of the first national institu-
tions, public or private, to promulgate anti-discrimination policies following World War II.
See Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 239, 251 (1998).
297. See James R. Devine, The Past as Moral Guide to the Present: The Parallel Be-
tween Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Elements of a Nonviolent Civil Rights Campaign and Jackie
Robinson's Entry onto the Brooklyn Dodgers, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 489, n. 288 (1996)
(discussing death threats against African-American players); Jeff Jacobs, For Green, Jitters
Never Subsided, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 15, 1997, at G2 (describing how former Red Sox
player Pumpsie Green had to overcome the prejudice of fans and lingering racism in baseball).
298. See John H. Morris, Do My Rights Get in the Way of My Freedom?, An Examina-
tion of the Role ofRights in a Society of Empowered People, 1 MARGINS L.J. 83, n. 5 (2001).
299. See Williams, supra note 288, at 289.; see generally Michael A. McCann, The
Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational Analysis of the NBA and Diminishing Player
Autonomy, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. _ (forthcoming, 2006) (postulating possible role of
race in efforts by NBA to curtail player autonomy) (draft available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=8786 11).




According to the study, Americans routinely expressed fears of
"Asian" merchandise and goods, as well as fears of working with per-
sons of Asian appearance, living near or going to school with them,
and sitting near them on airplanes.30 2 Remarkably, those who en-
gaged in such bigotry failed to appreciate that the vast majority of
Americans of Asian descent were born in the United States and had
never traveled to SARS-affected areas (let alone failing to recognize
that, as noted above, only one out of every 11 million Americans had
SARS).3 °3 Although there were no reports of professional athletes
suffering racial or ethnic discrimination due to SARS, it seems plau-
sible to expect that such discrimination may have arisen had SARS
worsened.
Thankfully, of course, the SARS outbreak ended before any of
the aforementioned scenarios could occur. Yet with the growing
threat of the Bird Flu and other contagions, professional sports actors
may eventually confront the concerns addressed above. Although
sports may supply a healing effect for communities stricken by com-
municable disease, cognitive biases, social norms, and situational in-
fluences often beget deleterious behaviors. For that reason, legal
safeguards are essential for the protection of individual autonomy and
livelihood otherwise endangered in a disease crisis.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to examine how professional
sports actors are influenced by calamities, and to postulate how legal
frameworks may mollify their responses. The four calamities studied
were catastrophic weather, natural disasters, terrorism, and communi-
cable disease. Each revealed the fragility and imperfection of profes-
301. See Bobbie Person et al., Fear and Stigma: The Epidemic Within the SARS Out-
break, 2 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 358 (2004). Similar discrimination occurred in
Canada. See generally Colleen M. Flood & Anthea Williams, A Tale of Toronto: National and
International Lessons in Public Health Governance from the SARS Crisis, 12 MICH. ST. J.
INT'L L. 229 (2004); see also Justin Schram, Personal Views: How Popular Perceptions of
Risk from SARS Are Fermenting Discrimination, 326 BRIT. MED.J. 939 (2003) (detailing how
Asian-Canadians living in Toronto were the subjects of prejudice).
302. Id.
303. See Mel Kohn, M.D., In My Opinion SARS Stigma is Based on Fear, Not Fact,
Opinion Editorial, OREGONIAN, May 29, 2003, at D07; see also Iris Chang, Fear of SARS,
Fear of Strangers, Opinion Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at 31 (detailing how dis-
crimination against Asians and Asian-Americans due to SARS fit a historical pattern of dis-
crimination against those peoples).
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sional sports actors, a striking contrast to their popular image as
strong and powerful, even indomitable. This article also illuminated
how cognitive errors, social norms, and situational influences tend to
better explain the behavior of professional sports actors in crises than
do traditional choice models. Considering that professional sports ac-
tors are either people or comprised of people, and thus subject to the
same tendencies and vulnerabilities that affect us all, their behavior in
crises may also intimate how calamities shape society, and how, dur-
ing those times, the law may be at its most essential.
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